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2 
satisfaction; (2) investigate the extent to which RC practices were adopted; and (3) 15 
identify the RC practices that lead to better performance. Due to the large 16 
geographical area of China, the surveys conducted were confined to Beijing and 17 
Hong Kong. A structured questionnaire was designed to collect qualitative data. The 18 
results show that: (1) public construction projects achieved significant success in 19 
quality performance and client satisfaction but not in budget and schedule 20 
performance; and (2) RC practices were adopted to varying extents in public projects. 21 
The findings contribute to knowledge by identifying the specific RC practices that 22 
could boost project performance significantly. Another contribution to knowledge is 23 
the discovery that the Relational Contract Theory is applicable to public projects 24 
notwithstanding the need to keep relations at arm’s length. A framework to manage 25 
public projects using the RC approach is recommended for adoption in Hong Kong 26 
and other countries that adopt project management style along PMI’s framework. A 27 
different framework is recommended for adoption in Beijing and places that have a 28 
centrally planned and controlled economic system so as to help public projects 29 
achieve better project performance. 30 
 31 
Subject headings: Relational Contracting, Public Construction Projects, Strategy, 32 






Relationships among contracting parties include formal transactions and relational 37 
links. Formal contracts spell out the rights, responsibilities, and liabilities of the parties 38 
concerned. In a formal contract, parties act in an atomized manner, looking out for 39 
their own personal interests (Williamson, 1975). Relational contracting (RC) is based 40 
on the recognition of mutual benefits and win-win scenarios that are achieved through 41 
more cooperative approaches, such as partnering, alliancing, joint venturing, 42 
long-term contracting, joint risk-sharing mechanisms, integrated project delivery, and 43 
other collaborative working arrangements (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004a; AIA, 44 
2007). While RC principles are less difficult to apply in projects initiated by the private 45 
sector (Kumaraswamy, 2010), the gap in knowledge is that it is not known if public 46 
sector projects can also enjoy the full benefits of RC, such as risk and cost reduction, 47 
and better project performance (Akintoye and Main, 2007).  48 
 49 
The term “RC practices” in this paper refers to “relational practices” or practices 50 
based on good relationship management, which are RC-type or RC-based, even 51 




China is a legitimate geographical region to investigate, as seen in many previous 54 
studies (examples are: Lu et al., 2008; Tai et al, 2009; Chan et al., 2009a; Zhao et al., 55 
2011). Due to its strong economic growth and need for national development, there 56 
are many opportunities for architectural, engineering and construction (A/E/C) firms to 57 
operate in China’s construction industry. However, the Chinese market is full of pitfalls 58 
as well. It is fragmented, heterogeneous, risky and highly competitive (Chen and 59 
Messner, 2009). To perform well in the Chinese market, knowledge of the types of RC 60 
practices that lead to project success may be important. Hence, the aim of this study 61 
is to investigate effective RC practices in China’s public construction projects. The 62 
specific objectives are to: (1) evaluate public project performance levels in terms of 63 
cost, time, quality, and client satisfaction; (2) investigate the extent to which RC 64 
practices are adopted; and (3) identify the RC practices that lead to better 65 
performance of public projects in China. 66 
 67 
Due to China’s large geographical area, the scope of this study is confined to public 68 
construction projects in Beijing and Hong Kong. The capital city of Beijing was chosen 69 
for study as it has a significant number of completed public projects for the 2008 70 
Olympics and also because it is representative of how a centrally planned economy 71 
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operates. Hong Kong, a former British colony and now a Special Administrative 72 
Region, was chosen for study because its construction practices are closer to those of 73 
A/E/C firms that operate in free market economies. The geographic specific findings 74 
of Beijing and Hong Kong could be applied to centrally planned economies and free 75 
market economies, respectively, in the context of the broader global community. The 76 
contrast between practices in Beijing and Hong Kong helps A/E/C firms that are 77 
currently operating in a free market economy and planning to enter a centrally 78 
planned market to better understand the differences between the RC practices in 79 
different markets. Particular attention could be paid to the key RC practices identified 80 
in this study to help them achieve better project outcomes. 81 
 82 
In the next section, a literature review of project performance and RC practices is 83 
presented and the knowledge gaps are identified. The research design and data 84 
analysis method are then explained, followed by the presentation of the 85 
characteristics of the sample. Next, the extent to which RC practices are adopted in 86 
Beijing and Hong Kong are compared and discussed, and key RC practices that lead 87 
to better project performance are identified. The last section summarizes the findings 88 





Literature Review 92 
 93 
Operationalizing Project Performance 94 
 95 
Project outcomes are multi-faceted. These include the traditional triple project 96 
outcomes (time, cost, and quality), safety performance, environmental performance, 97 
stakeholder satisfaction, and profitability. For this study, project outcome is viewed 98 
from the perspective of project delivery and organizational level competency. For 99 
project delivery competency, this research adopts the traditional triple project 100 
outcomes as the performance metrics, following Konchar and Sanvido (1998). For 101 
organizational level competency, service quality is operationalized as client 102 
satisfaction with the project, following Ling et al. (2004). 103 
 104 
RC Practices Affecting Project Performance 105 
 106 
Different aspects of RC have been covered in previous studies. These include drivers 107 
(Chan et al., 2003), obstacles (Glagola and Sheedy, 2002), success factors (Chan et 108 
al., 2004), components like trust (Wong et al., 2005), culture (Ang and Ofori, 2001), 109 
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communication (Bayliss et al., 2004), and performance index (Yeung et al., 2007). 110 
This study postulates that there are certain RC practices that significantly affect the 111 
performance of public construction projects in China. RC practices were identified 112 
from the literature review and summarized in Table 1. For brevity, these practices are 113 
coded as “a”, “b” and “c” for client, contractor, and consultant, respectively, followed 114 
by a reference number. These RC practices are divided into three categories: (1) 115 
individual organizational features and practices adopted by each contracting party 116 
(coded as a-#, b-# and c-#); (2) practices adopted in tandem by two of the contracting 117 
parties (coded as ab-#, ac-# and bc-#); and (3) practices adopted by all the major 118 
contracting parties in unison (code: abc-#). “#” represents the reference number of 119 
the RC practice. 120 
 121 
<Insert Table 1 here.> 122 
 123 
Knowledge Gaps 124 
 125 
The Relational Contract Theory views contracts more as relations rather than as 126 
discrete transactions and thus, all transactions involve a wider social and economic 127 
context (Macneil, 1974). The theory states that individual transactions lie on a 128 
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spectrum ranging from “discrete” through to “relational”. The theory challenges the 129 
traditional premise that all contracts are mere transactions, and emphasizes the role 130 
of norms in determining the manner in which commercial exchanges operate in 131 
practice. These norms are further operationalized into RC approaches/practices. 132 
 133 
The brief literature review revealed that previous studies on RC approaches did not 134 
differentiate between public and private construction projects. Whether RC principles 135 
could be applied successfully and specifically to public construction projects remains 136 
unclear.  137 
 138 
Public projects merit an in-depth study because public clients are usually not in the 139 
position to offer future relationship incentives since most projects must be procured 140 
through the competitive bidding process, and government regulations traditionally 141 
discourage close relationships between public clients and private contracting parties 142 
(Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b). Yet, public projects are highly visible and need 143 
to achieve the triple project goals because taxpayers’ money is involved.  144 
 145 
The link between the adoption of RC practices and project outcomes is also not 146 
known. This study therefore aims to fill the gap by investigating the relevance of the 147 
 
9 
Relational Contract Theory to public contracts through exploring RC practices that 148 
may boost the performance of public projects in China significantly. 149 
 150 
Research Method 151 
 152 
A large study had been conducted on RC practices and the drivers of and barriers to 153 
relational contracts, as well as how these affect the performance of public 154 
construction projects in China, Australia, and Singapore. This paper reports a part of 155 
the study, focusing on RC practices and project outcomes in China. 156 
 157 
Research Design 158 
 159 
The questionnaire-survey is the adopted choice of research design for this study. The 160 
survey was conducted between June and November 2011 in Beijing and Hong Kong. 161 
The objectives of the survey that are relevant to this paper are twofold: (1) to evaluate 162 
the performance outcomes of completed public construction projects; and (2) to 163 
determine the extent to which RC practices were present, observed, practiced or 164 




The unit of analysis in this study is a completed public sector project, regardless of 167 
the extent to which RC approaches were adopted. The target population is thus 168 
completed public projects in China, and the sampling frame is hence completed 169 
public projects in Beijing and Hong Kong. In order to collect the data, multiple 170 
stakeholders comprising public sector clients and consultants, private sector 171 
consultants (e.g. architects, engineers, quantity surveyors, and project managers), 172 
and contractors, who had been involved in public construction projects in Beijing and 173 
Hong Kong, were approached. However, due to the lack of a national registry of 174 
officials/firms involved in public construction projects, the contact details of public 175 
officials were obtained from government directories. Questionnaires were then sent to 176 
all of them because the number is not large. The contact details of private consultants 177 
and contractors were derived from the respective professional and trade institutions, 178 
and randomly selected. As this group may contain those who have not handled public 179 
projects before, the questionnaire clearly stated that only those who had completed 180 
public projects should fill up the questionnaire. 181 
 182 
Data were collected using a specially designed structured questionnaire. Section A of 183 
the questionnaire requested information on the completed public sector project and 184 
the project’s performance level in four areas: cost (Y1); time (Y2); quality (Y3); and 185 
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client satisfaction (Y4). Y1 and Y2 were measured more objectively as percentage of 186 
time and cost over/under run. Y3 measured quality of output, stated as product/output 187 
quality of the facility/project. Y4 measured quality of service, stated as client 188 
satisfaction with the contracting parties’ service quality. Service quality measures the 189 
transformation process (i.e. the service) from resources to the constructed facility. Y3 190 
and Y4 were relatively subjective and thus rated on a five-point Likert scale (1 = Very 191 
dissatisfied, 3 = Neutral, 5 = Very satisfied). In Section B, respondents were asked to 192 
indicate the extent to which RC practices were adopted on a five-point Likert scale (1 193 
= Very low, 3 = Neutral, 5 = Very high). Respondents were also given the opportunity 194 
to provide other suggestions and demographic characteristics of themselves and their 195 
companies. The questionnaire was pilot tested and then translated into Chinese. 196 
 197 
Data Analysis Method 198 
 199 
The data were analyzed using SPSS software. The main statistical methods used 200 
were descriptive statistics, one-way ANOVA, one-sample t test and Pearson’s 201 
correlation analysis. The Confidence Interval (CI) was set at 0.95. One-way ANOVA 202 
was conducted to check if there is any significant difference in the extent to which RC 203 
practices were adopted in Beijing and Hong Kong. The one-sample t test procedure 204 
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was performed on the four performance metrics (Y1 to Y4) and the RC practices to 205 
determine if the projects achieved significantly good performance and if the practices 206 
were adopted to a significant extent, respectively. To check whether a greater 207 
adoption of RC practices led to better project outcomes, Pearson’s correlation 208 
analysis was conducted. Each pair of variables in the Pearson’s correlation analysis 209 
comprised one of the four performance metrics and one of the RC practices. 210 
 211 
Characteristics of the sample 212 
 213 
Survey questionnaires were sent to 259 and 645 samples in Beijing and Hong Kong, 214 
respectively. 59 and 51 valid questionnaires were returned in Beijing and Hong Kong, 215 
representing response rates of 22.78% and 7.91%, respectively. Many more samples 216 
were identified in Hong Kong than in Beijing because Hong Kong has more easily 217 
available published information of names of public officials and private contractors 218 
and consultants. However, this collection comprised a mix of private firms that had 219 
and did not have experience in public projects. As the questionnaire instructed those 220 
without experience in public sector projects not to reply, even though more 221 
questionnaires were sent out in Hong Kong, the fact that there are fewer public sector 222 





As regards sample validity, it is observed that more than 30 sets of valid project data 226 
were received.  The general convention is that when n>30, the central limit theorem 227 
holds true.  Moreover, questionnaires were sent to all the public offices that manage 228 
public construction projects in Beijing and Hong Kong.  No public office had been 229 
deliberately left out.  Cronbach’s alpha values of three categories of RC practices in 230 
Beijing and Hong Kong ranged from 0.832 to 0.938, suggesting that the RC practices 231 
under each category have a high internal consistency (Nunnally, 1978). It is therefore 232 
concluded that these data are reliable and further statistical analyses may be 233 
conducted (Nunnally, 1978). 234 
 235 
The characteristics of the respondents are given in Table 2. All the respondents have 236 
extensive construction experience in various types of public construction projects. 237 
The Beijing and Hong Kong respondents had an average of 11 and 22 years of 238 
experience, respectively. The respondents’ firms engage an average of 19,934 and 239 
3,097 employees in Beijing and Hong Kong, respectively. In the light of the rich 240 
experience of the respondents as shown in Table 2, these respondents should be in a 241 
position to accurately assess the extent to which RC practices were present, 242 
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observed, practiced or emphasized in the project. 243 
 244 
<Insert Table 2 here.> 245 
 246 
Result 1: Performance of Public Projects in Beijing and Hong Kong 247 
 248 
The first objective of this study is to evaluate project performance levels based on 249 
cost, time, quality, and client satisfaction. The t test results in Table 3 show that public 250 
construction projects in Beijing achieved significantly good performance in client 251 
satisfaction (3.32, p=0.000) and quality (3.19, p=0.002), but had significantly poor 252 
cost performance (10.42% cost overrun, p=0.006) and marginally failed in time 253 
performance (8.41% schedule overrun, p=0.062). Public construction projects in 254 
Hong Kong also achieved significantly good performance in client satisfaction (3.88, 255 
p=0.000) and quality (3.98, p=0.000), but their mean scores are significantly higher 256 
than those in Beijing. Similar to Beijing, the results show that public projects in Hong 257 
Kong had significantly poor cost performance (12.50%, p=0.000) and time 258 
performance (17.78%, p=0.000). 259 
 260 




Poor cost performance could have arose because of the prevalent practice of under 263 
bidding, hidden costs which surface only at the later stage, (Ling et al., 2006a) and 264 
inability to respond adequately to perceived change orders (Ling et al., 2008). Poor 265 
time performance may be due to Chinese clients changing the project scope and 266 
issuing too many change orders (Ling et al., 2006a). While changes were ordered on 267 
site, sometimes, the client’s top management may not approve them, giving rise to 268 
abortive work and further delays (Ling et al, 2006a). Project delays may also come 269 
about because of holdups in getting approvals (Ling et al, 2008). 270 
 271 
Result 2: RC Practices Adopted in Beijing and Hong Kong 272 
 273 
The second objective of this study is to investigate the extent to which RC practices 274 
were adopted in Beijing and Hong Kong using t test of the mean. The t test results in 275 
Tables 4 and 5 show that there are RC practices that had been adopted to a 276 
significant extent in Beijing and Hong Kong’s public projects. The finding suggests 277 
that Macneil’s (1974) Relational Contract Theory is applicable to public projects 278 
although these generally comprise discrete transactions with little opportunity for 279 




ANOVA results in Table 3 show that 13 practices were adopted to significantly 282 
different extents in Beijing and Hong Kong. Among these, 10 RC practices were used 283 
more frequently in Hong Kong, while only three practices were adopted more 284 
frequently in Beijing, indicating that RC concepts are generally more acceptable to 285 
contracting parties in public construction projects in Hong Kong. The implication is 286 
that A/E/C firms planning to penetrate a different type of market (e.g. centrally 287 
controlled economies versus free market economies) should pay particular attention 288 
to these 13 RC practices in order to gain an advantage over local firms. 289 
 290 
Public clients in Beijing adopted the following RC practices to a significantly lower 291 
extent compared to Hong Kong clients – strengthening their financial capacity (a-6); 292 
acquiring knowledge of project processes (a-8); committing to other parties on a 293 
long-term basis (a-9); and adopting a positive attitude toward continuous 294 
improvement (a-16). The results echoed Sachs et al.’s (2007) finding that some local 295 
governments in mainland China lack the relevant experience and knowledge in 296 
construction, or focus too much on short-term objectives. Public organizations are 297 
usually restrained by an inertia that may stem from beliefs such as “that is not our 298 
responsibility”, “there is no need to change current practices that are already good 299 
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enough (or even better than others)”, or a “not invented here” syndrome 300 
(Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 2000). This inertia is more evident in Beijing 301 
than in Hong Kong, as the long-standing bureaucratic culture in mainland China has 302 
often been criticized for its lack of openness and flexibility (Piotrowski et al., 2009). In 303 
addition, unlike local governments in mainland China which suffer from a lack of funds, 304 
the Hong Kong government has adequate financial reserves and enjoys a budget 305 
surplus (Chan et al., 2009a). 306 
 307 
Table 3 shows that compared to Hong Kong, contractors in Beijing had significantly 308 
fewer opportunities to provide specific inputs on construction methods and materials 309 
before they were formally appointed (b-13). This may be due to the Hong Kong 310 
government’s more positive attitude toward promoting integration in the construction 311 
industry by encouraging contractors to give their feedback before they are formally 312 
appointed. 313 
 314 
Contracting parties in public construction projects in Beijing have lower levels of 315 
long-term commitment to other parties (a-9, b-9 & c-9) than those in Hong Kong. The 316 
Beijing government has been investing heavily in infrastructure development and thus 317 
the market for public construction projects in Beijing is huge (BMBS, 2011). This 318 
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market situation of high construction demand causes private firms in Beijing to 319 
disregard the need to have any long-term commitments with other parties.  320 
 321 
Compared to those in Hong Kong, contractors and consultants in Beijing are less 322 
familiar with each other (bc-1) and less likely to share information (bc-6). As Beijing’s 323 
construction market is six times larger than Hong Kong’s in terms of gross value of 324 
construction work (BMBS, 2011; CSD, 2011), it is therefore less likely for contractors 325 
and consultants in Beijing to have prior relationships. This lack of familiarity between 326 
contractors and consultants in Beijing may cause them to adopt a more adversarial 327 
stance with each other than those in Hong Kong, which could lead to lower 328 
enthusiasm to share project information. 329 
 330 
Table 3 shows that “Clarity of division of responsibilities among contracting parties” 331 
(abc-1) was rated significantly higher in Hong Kong than in Beijing. As public 332 
construction projects in Hong Kong adopt standard conditions of contract, the division 333 
of responsibilities is clearer than in Beijing, where in-house or bespoke contracts are 334 
preferred (Lu, 2005). 335 
 336 
“Level of reciprocation/face-saving gestures between the client and contractor” (ab-8), 337 
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“Collective/combined responsibility by a pre-selected group comprising one person 338 
from each major party” (abc-4) and “Effectiveness of team-building events used in the 339 
project” (abc-13) were rated significantly higher in Beijing than in Hong Kong. This 340 
may be attributed to the “guanxi” that exists in Chinese culture. Private participants in 341 
Beijing have to spend much more time and effort to cultivate guanxi with public clients 342 
than those in Hong Kong (Sachs et al., 2007). There are hence many entertainment 343 
activities that need to be carried out in order to cultivate and maintain good 344 
relationships with public clients in Beijing. In Hong Kong, this is not so pronounced 345 
because the government departments are inherited from the British, and these have 346 
well-defined responsibilities and codes of conduct. They are usually not allowed to 347 
participate in team-building events with private firms and cannot receive nor 348 
reciprocate favors. 349 
 350 
Result 3: RC Practices Affecting Project Outcomes 351 
 352 
The third objective of this study is to identify RC practices that lead to better project 353 
performance. Tables 4 and 5 list the RC practices in Beijing and Hong Kong, 354 
respectively, that are significantly correlated with performance metrics (Y1 to Y4) in 355 
an ascending order based on mean ratings. The mean ratings measure the extent to 356 
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which the RC practices were adopted. Significant negative correlations with Y1 and 357 
Y2 and significant positive correlations with Y3 and Y4 suggest that when the RC 358 
practice is adopted to a larger extent, the project performance is also significantly 359 
better. Overall, 32 and 56 out of a total of 88 practices are significantly correlated with 360 
performance outcomes of public construction projects in Beijing and Hong Kong, 361 
respectively. The result indicates that RC principles have greater impact on the 362 
outcomes of public construction projects in Hong Kong than in Beijing. 363 
 364 
<Insert Tables 4 and 5 here.> 365 
 366 
Key RC practices are defined in this study as those significantly correlated with 367 
project performance but not adopted to a significant extent. As shown in Tables 4 and 368 
5, there were eight and 11 of these key RC practices in Beijing and Hong Kong, 369 
respectively. These RC practices are further depicted in Figure 1. The discussions in 370 
the following sub-sections focus on these key RC practices. 371 
 372 
<Insert Figure 1 here.> 373 
 374 
RC practices affecting project performance significantly are depicted in Figures 2 and 375 
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3 for Beijing and Hong Kong, respectively. It is suggested that contracting parties 376 
adopt these RC practices to a greater extent in future projects so as to achieve better 377 
project performance. In terms of generalizing the findings to the broader global 378 
community, Figure 2 is important for firms when investing in a centrally controlled 379 
economy like China, while Figure 3 is useful for adoption in a free market economy. 380 
 381 
<Insert Figures 2 and 3 here.> 382 
 383 
Cost Performance (Y1) 384 
 385 
Table 4 shows that the cost performance of public construction projects in Beijing is 386 
significantly correlated with five RC practices. On the other hand, there are 16 RC 387 
practices that are significantly correlated with the cost performance of public 388 
construction projects in Hong Kong (see Table 5). Among them, clients’ attitude 389 
toward continuous improvement (a-16) and consultants’ top management support for 390 
RC practices (c-15) are significantly correlated with cost performance in both Beijing 391 
and Hong Kong. The findings agree with Black et al. (2000) that a positive attitude 392 





Among the five RC practices in Beijing that are significantly correlated with cost 396 
performance, only one – client’s knowledge level of project processes (a-8) – was not 397 
adopted to a significant extent and hence needs to be highlighted. Clients’ lack of 398 
knowledge of project processes could lead to an inadequate brief and feasibility study 399 
or an inaccurate pre-tender estimate, which may eventually result in cost overrun 400 
(Ling and Leong, 2002). It is therefore recommended that public sector organizations 401 
capture the knowledge and information on project processes, products, and 402 
technology after a project is completed so that better project outcomes can be 403 
attained in future projects (Love et al., 2010). For the “one-off” type of client who 404 
develops only one project in a long while, it may not be worthwhile to acquire in-depth 405 
construction knowledge. In this instance, choosing a reputable and knowledgeable 406 
consultant is suggested. 407 
 408 
Four RC practices in Hong Kong, i.e. “Clearly defined equitable risk-sharing 409 
arrangement among contracting parties” (abc-6), “Ongoing social relationships 410 
between clients and contractors” (ab-7), “Ongoing social relationships between 411 
clients and consultants” (ac-7), and “Consultants’ previous experience in relational 412 
contracting approaches” (c-10), were not adopted to a significant extent yet had 413 
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significant correlation with cost performance. This indicates that the RC practices 414 
need more attention. 415 
 416 
The respondents in Hong Kong regarded the practice “Clearly defined equitable 417 
risk-sharing arrangement among contracting parties” (abc-6) as a key RC practice 418 
affecting cost and time performance, and this supports the view of Rahman and 419 
Kumaraswamy (2002). Yet, this practice was not adopted to a significant extent 420 
because the public sector’s standard conditions of contract drafted by public bodies 421 
may be biased toward the public client. 422 
 423 
Table 5 shows “Ongoing social relationships (e.g. “guanxi” and social ties outside of 424 
the project)” between clients and contractors/consultants (ab-7 and ac-7) are key RC 425 
practices because they were significantly correlated with cost performance, but not 426 
adopted to a significant extent. These mutual ongoing social relationships outside of 427 
the project between clients and other contracting parties do not commonly exist in 428 
public construction projects in Hong Kong. One explanation could be that the 429 
procurement procedures in public construction projects in Hong Kong are subject to 430 
strict regulations, and competitive bidding is almost always required (Rahman and 431 
Kumaraswamy, 2004b). However, this study found that closer ongoing social 432 
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relationships among contracting parties are significantly correlated with cost (Y1) and 433 
time performance (Y2), and client satisfaction (Y4). This could be attributed to the 434 
trust and friendship that are present in ongoing relationships, causing contracting 435 
parties to be more willing to compromise should problems arise and thus achieve 436 
better outcomes (Castro et al., 2009). The implication is that past and current 437 
relationships may be taken into account in the selection of contractors and 438 
consultants. 439 
 440 
Table 5 shows that consultants’ previous experience in RC approaches (c-10) is 441 
significantly correlated with cost performance (Y1) and client satisfaction (Y4), but not 442 
adopted to a significant extent in Hong Kong. As explained in the introduction, it is still 443 
not known if public sector projects can enjoy the full benefits of RC. It is 444 
understandable that consultants lack experience in RC approaches. 445 
 446 
Time Performance (Y2) 447 
 448 
Significant negative correlation was observed between schedule overrun of public 449 
construction projects in Beijing and eight RC practices (see Table 4), while 14 RC 450 
practices are significantly and negatively correlated with time performance in Hong 451 
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Kong (see Table 5). There is no common practice in the two lists. In Beijing, 452 
contractors were involved in five out of eight RC practices, while in Hong Kong, 13 out 453 
of 14 practices relate to clients. 454 
 455 
Table 4 shows that the eight RC practices that significantly affect time performance 456 
are all significantly adopted in past public construction projects in Beijing. This may be 457 
attributed to the Chinese government’s strong emphasis on the timely completion of 458 
public projects (Liu et al., 2010). It could also be observed in Table 3 that time overrun 459 
in Beijing’s public construction projects was not significant (t=1.904, p=0.062), which 460 
is consistent with the findings here. 461 
 462 
Among the 14 RC practices that are significantly correlated with time performance in 463 
Hong Kong, five practices were not adopted to a significant extent in past projects. 464 
These are: “Clearly defined equitable risk-sharing arrangement among contracting 465 
parties” (abc-6), “Effectiveness of team-building events used in the project” (abc-13), 466 
“Ongoing social relationships between clients and contractors” (ab-7), “Client has 467 
organizational culture that fits relational contracting practices” (a-5), and “Previous 468 
experience in RC approaches” (a-10). Practices abc-6 and ab-7 had significant 469 
correlation with both time performance (Y2) and cost performance (Y1) and have 470 
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been discussed in the previous section. 471 
 472 
“Effectiveness of team-building events used in the project” (abc-13) was not 473 
significantly observed in past public construction projects in Hong Kong. However, as 474 
shown in Table 5, significant correlations were found with time performance (Y2) and 475 
client satisfaction (Y4). In Hong Kong, officials in public departments that are modeled 476 
after the British system are not allowed to participate in team-building events at an 477 
inter-personal level. Therefore, contracting parties would rely more on contractual 478 
arrangements to guard against trouble, and this rigidity may increase the time needed 479 
to execute a project and lead to delays. As team building in the early phases of a 480 
project was found to influence participants’ behavior and increase project knowledge 481 
(Kadefors, 2004), making more effort in team building is recommended (Diallo and 482 
Thuillier, 2005). 483 
 484 
The results show that clients’ “organizational culture fits RC practices” (a-5) and 485 
“previous experience in RC approaches” (a-10) were not adopted to a significant 486 
extent, yet had significant correlation with time performance (Y2). This agrees with 487 
Chan and Kumaraswamy’s (1997) finding that client-initiated variation is one of the 488 
principal and common causes of delays in Hong Kong, especially when introduced 489 
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mid-stream. Clients’ lack of an appropriate organizational culture that fits RC 490 
practices is the main reason for ineffective project partnering (Ng et al., 2002), and is 491 
more critical for public clients (Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 2000). 492 
 493 
Quality Performance (Y3) 494 
 495 
Quality performance of public construction projects in Beijing is significantly 496 
correlated with 13 RC practices. Five out of the 13 practices were not adopted to a 497 
significant extent in past public construction projects. On the other hand, 19 RC 498 
practices have significant correlation with quality performance in Hong Kong, and two 499 
of these were not adopted to a significant extent.  500 
 501 
Contractors’ top management support for RC practices (b-15) was significantly 502 
correlated with quality performance in both Beijing and Hong Kong. It is the senior 503 
management’s responsibility to set policies, control resources and train staff. RC is 504 
therefore unlikely to succeed without the backing of top management (Akintoye and 505 
Main, 2007). 506 
 507 
Five out of the 13 RC practices that are significantly correlated with quality 508 
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performance in Beijing were not adopted to a significant extent. These include: 509 
clients’ level of innovation/creativity (a-1) and investment in development of 510 
collaborative working skills (a-17), consultants’ investment in development of 511 
collaborative working skills (c-17), contractors’ level of innovation/creativity (b-1), and 512 
ongoing social relationships between contractors and consultants (bc-7). 513 
 514 
As clients are responsible for the preparation of clear and unambiguous specifications 515 
(Jha and Iyer, 2006), they play an important role in helping the project to achieve the 516 
desired quality level and need to be competent in defining the level of expected 517 
quality. This may explain why clients’ level of innovation/creativity (a-1) and 518 
investment in development of collaborative working skills (a-17) had significant 519 
correlation with quality performance. However, public clients in Beijing are usually 520 
infrequent clients or “one-off” clients (Ke et al., 2011), who are unable to be innovative 521 
and are not motivated to develop collaborative working skills because they do not 522 
have a demand for construction products on a regular basis. 523 
 524 
Consultants’ investment in the development of collaborative working skills (c-17) was 525 
not significantly adopted in Beijing, yet had significant impact on quality performance. 526 
Zhao et al. (2011) also found that modern project management tools and techniques 527 
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have not been extensively adopted by consultants in China’s construction industry. 528 
Under such an environment, it is understandable that consultants do not invest much 529 
in the development of collaborative working skills in Beijing. As consultants are 530 
important links between clients and contractors, a higher level of collaborative 531 
working skills of consultants would increase the interaction among project participants, 532 
improve mutual understanding and information sharing, and thereafter boost quality 533 
performance (Jha and Iyer, 2006). 534 
 535 
Contractors’ level of innovation/creativity (b-1) showed a significant correlation with 536 
quality performance, perhaps due to its impact on the contractors’ operations and 537 
output (Yasamis et al., 2002). Consistent with the low contribution rate of science and 538 
technology to China’s construction industry (Lu et al., 2008), contractors in Beijing 539 
may be unwilling to invest in innovation because of the uncertain outcome. 540 
 541 
Ongoing social relationships between contractors and consultants (bc-7) engender 542 
good communication, thereby facilitating proper monitoring and timely feedback, 543 
which enhance project quality. Ongoing social relationships also enable instances of 544 
poor workmanship or improper usage of resources to be reported promptly, and this 545 




In Hong Kong, consultants’ readiness to compromise on unclear issues (c-11) and the 548 
level of reciprocation/face-saving gestures between clients and consultants (ac-8) are 549 
key RC practices that are significantly correlated with quality performance (Y3) and 550 
client satisfaction (Y4). Currently the Hong Kong government uses a two-envelope 551 
system (i.e. technical aspects of the proposal in one envelope and consulting fees in 552 
the other) for consultant selection (Baark and Wai, 2000). It is therefore difficult for the 553 
client to make a reciprocation /face-saving gesture and directly employ a consultant. 554 
Meanwhile, the readiness to compromise on unclear issues is perceived to be an 555 
important factor in implementing RC principles (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004a). 556 
This is more so for consultants, as they prepare specifications and drawings that are 557 
usually far from perfect, and so, compromises on unclear issues need to be made by 558 
consultants in order to improve quality performance.  559 
 560 
Client Satisfaction (Y4) 561 
 562 
Table 4 shows that client satisfaction is significantly correlated with 11 RC practices in 563 
Beijing. As shown in Table 5, 39 RC practices have significant correlation with client 564 
satisfaction in Hong Kong. The large difference between the numbers of correlated 565 
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practices in these two cities may to some extent reflect the greater emphasis and 566 
expectation of collaborative behaviors in Hong Kong. Six RC practices were common 567 
to both Beijing and Hong Kong. These include three individual features and practices 568 
adopted by contractors, and three mutual practices among contracting parties. The 569 
former are: “Level of innovation/creativity” (b-1), “Knowledge level of project 570 
processes” (b-8), and “Long-term commitment level” (b-9). The latter are: “Sharing of 571 
project information between contractor and consultant” (bc-6), “Ongoing social 572 
relationships between clients and consultants” (ac-7), and “Level of inter-personal 573 
relations/cultural harmony between clients and contractors” (ab-5). 574 
 575 
In Beijing, three out of the six RC practices affecting client satisfaction (b-1, bc-6, ac-7) 576 
were not adopted to a significant extent. b-1 has been discussed in the previous 577 
section.  578 
 579 
The sharing of project information between contractors and consultants (bc-6) would 580 
enable contractors to better understand the design and consultants to promptly 581 
identify potential conflicts, leading to higher client satisfaction. However, each party in 582 
mainland China tends to treat information as confidential rather than something to be 583 
shared. This is to prevent its own interests from being compromised as there is 584 
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conflict of interests among the participants, especially between contractors and 585 
consultants (Tai et al., 2009).  586 
 587 
The reason why “Ongoing social relationship between clients and consultants” (ac-7) 588 
was not significantly adopted in Beijing may be attributed to the current procurement 589 
system, which was discussed above. It is worth noting that there is a significant 590 
negative correlation between Beijing’s client satisfaction and the ongoing 591 
relationships between clients and consultants, which is a direct contrast to Hong Kong. 592 
Zuo and Ma (2007) found that one of the major issues in China’s consultancy industry 593 
is that the responsibilities of consultants are usually not clearly defined. Due to the 594 
ongoing social relationships between clients and consultants, they may have signed a 595 
loose contract where the responsibilities of consultants are not clearly spelt out. 596 
Clients could thereafter be less satisfied. 597 
 598 
Table 5 shows that eight RC practices that significantly affect client satisfaction were 599 
not significantly adopted in Hong Kong. They comprise two individual features and 600 
practices of consultants, four mutual practices, and two joint practices. The two 601 
individual features and practices of consultants are: “Previous experience in RC 602 
approaches” (c-10) and “Readiness to compromise on unclear issues” (c-11). The 603 
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four mutual practices are: “Ongoing social relationships” among contracting parties 604 
(ab-7, ac-7 & bc-7) and “Level of reciprocation/face-saving gestures between clients 605 
and consultants” (ac-8). The two joint practices are: “Collective/combined 606 
responsibility by a pre-selected group comprising one person from each major party” 607 
(abc-4) and “Effectiveness of team-building events used in the project” (abc-13). 608 
Among them, practices c-10, c-11, ab-7, ac-7, ac-8, and abc-13 have significant 609 
correlation with other performance indexes, which has been discussed above. 610 
 611 
Ongoing social relationships among contracting parties (ab-7, ac-7 & bc-7) were 612 
found to be significantly correlated with client satisfaction in Hong Kong. This is 613 
consistent with Castro et al.’s (2009) finding that construction companies form 614 
coalitions principally on the basis of past or current relationships. 615 
 616 
“Collective/combined responsibility by a pre-selected group comprising one person 617 
from each major party” (abc-4) is currently not a common behavior in Hong Kong. An 618 
independent facilitator is sometimes appointed to chair a few workshops and assist in 619 
fostering confidence among the contracting parties (Chan et al., 2009b). However, the 620 
facilitator would not be involved throughout the whole life of the project. Therefore, a 621 






This study investigated RC practices that are adopted in public construction projects 626 
in China. Using a structured questionnaire, data were collected from experienced 627 
contracting parties who had been personally involved in public construction projects 628 
in Beijing and Hong Kong. The statistical analysis revealed that public construction 629 
projects in both cities had achieved significantly good quality performance and client 630 
satisfaction but not in budget and schedule performance. However, public 631 
construction projects in Hong Kong achieved significantly better performance in 632 
owner satisfaction and quality than those in Beijing.   633 
 634 
The main findings (see Tables 4 and 5) are: 32 and 56 RC practices are significantly 635 
correlated with the performance outcomes of public construction projects in Beijing 636 
and Hong Kong, respectively; and eight and 11 of these RC practices in Beijing and 637 
Hong Kong, respectively, are key practices as they are not adopted to a significant 638 
extent but are significantly correlated with performance outcomes. The unique value 639 
of the findings to the construction engineering and management community is the 640 
identification of a list of key RC practices which could be adopted as they lead to 641 
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better project outcomes. Some of these key RC practices are: having collective 642 
responsibility comprising one person from each major contracting party; sharing risks 643 
equitably among contracting parties; organizing effective team-building events; 644 
sharing project information among contracting parties; developing collaborative 645 
working skills; and compromising on unclear issues. 646 
 647 
Another main finding is that 13 practices were adopted to significantly different 648 
extents in Hong Kong and Beijing. To generalize the findings to the broader global 649 
community, to a limited extent, the findings from Hong Kong may be applicable to 650 
countries that adopt the open market economy, while those from Beijing may be 651 
implemented by countries that adopt a planned economy. Hong Kong’s open market 652 
is indicated by its global competitiveness rank of 11 out of 142 countries, which is 653 
comparable to the US and UK’s rankings of 5th and 10th respectively, and ahead of 654 
Australia’s 20th placing (World Economic Forum, 2011).  As for Beijing, its planned 655 
economy is also known as authoritarian capitalism (McGregor, 2012) where the state 656 
directs and controls a large share of the country’s economic output. The central 657 
planning extends to allocation of workload through administrative orders (Zhang, 658 
2003). The implications of the findings for the global communities that adopt project 659 
management style along PMI’s (2008) framework are: they should have better 660 
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division of responsibilities among contracting parties; share more project information; 661 
and have long-term commitment to the project. On the other hand, in planned 662 
economies, RC practices that are adopted to a significantly larger extent are having 663 
combined responsibility comprising one person from each major contracting party, 664 
and organizing effective team-building events.  665 
 666 
The results show that public projects in China had adopted many RC practices 667 
among contracting parties to a significant extent, such as alignment of objectives, 668 
joint coordination and monitoring of plans, and joint problem solving. The findings 669 
contribute to the body of knowledge by showing that the Relational Contract Theory is 670 
valid for public projects even though they are procured through open bidding, and 671 
hence do not lend themselves to future relationships. The implication is that A/E/C 672 
firms should approach public projects with a relational mindset and not view them as 673 
discrete transactions just because the public sector uses open bidding. Another 674 
contribution to knowledge is that the relational approach is shown to be important as it 675 
leads to better project outcomes. 676 
 677 
One limitation faced in this study is that correlation does not mean causation. 678 
Therefore the results should be interpreted carefully. Correlation statistics should not 679 
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be taken as conclusive evidence that those RC practices are definitely the most 680 
appropriate ones to be adopted. Secondly, the findings are not easily generalized to 681 
different regions in China, as the public projects that were used to inform this 682 
research were from Beijing and Hong Kong only. Finally, the population size could not 683 
be estimated, and hence the significance of the sample could not be determined 684 
mathematically.  In future studies, data from other regions in China could be 685 
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Table 1: Features and Practices Identified 




Level of innovation/creativity a-1, b-1, c-1 Chan et al., 2004; Cheng et al., 
2000 
Commitment of resources to the project a-2, b-2, c-2 Cheng et al., 2000; Chen and Chen, 
2007 
Effort in implementing relational contracting practices a-3, b-3, c-3 Black et al., 2000; Chen and Chen, 
2007 
Acceptance of relational contracting practices a-4, b-4, c-4 Black et al., 2000; Kumaraswamy et 
al., 2005b 
Organizational culture fit to relational contracting practices a-5, b-5, c-5 Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 
2004a, 2004b 
Financial capacity a-6, b-6, c-6 Black et al., 2000; Chen and Chen, 
2007 
Flexibility when situations change a-7, b-7, c-7 Chen and Chen, 2007; Ling et al., 
2006b 
Knowledge level of project processes a-8, b-8, c-8 Cheng et al., 2000; Love et al., 
2010 
Long-term commitment level a-9, b-9, c-9 Cheng et al., 2000 
Previous experience in relational contracting approaches a-10, b-10, c-10 Kumaraswamy et al., 2005a, b; 
Readiness to compromise on unclear issues a-11, b-11, c-11 Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 
2004a, b 
Reputation in the industry a-12, b-12, c-12 Powell, 1990; Gulati and Gargiulo, 
1999 
Specific inputs on construction methods, materials, etc, 
before they were formally appointed 
a-13, b-13, c-13 Bayliss et al., 2004; Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy, 2004b 
Team working attitude a-14, b-14, c-14 Black et al., 2000; Chen and Chen, 
2007 
Top management support for relational contracting practices a-15, b-15, c-15 Black et al., 2000, Akintoye and 
Main, 2007 
Table
Click here to download Table: Tables.doc 
Attitude toward continuous improvement a-16, b-16, c-16 Black et al., 2000; Chen and Chen, 
2007 






Familiarity/previous relationships  ab-1, ac-1, bc-1 Gulati, 1999; Zaheer and Soda, 
2009 
Mutual trust  ab-2, ac-2, bc-2 Xu et al., 2005; Kumaraswamy, et 
al., 2005b 
Mutual understanding  ab-3, ac-3, bc-3 Black, 2000; Love et al., 2010 
Open and effective communication  ab-4, ac-4, bc-4 Chen and Chen, 2007; Doloi, 2009 
Level of inter-personal relations/cultural harmony (individual 
level)  
ab-5, ac-5, bc-5 Kumaraswamy et al., 2005a; 
Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2008 
Sharing of project information  ab-6, ac-6, bc-6 Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003; Maurer 
and Ebers 2006 
Ongoing social relationships (e.g. “guanxi”, social ties, and 
kinship outside of this project)  
ab-7, ac-7, bc-7 Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Castro et 
al., 2009 





Clarity of division of responsibilities among contracting 
parties 
abc-1 Anvuur and Kumaraswamy, 2007; 
Halman and Braks, 1999 
Acceptance of performance appraisal mechanism for the 
project 
abc-2 Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 
2004a, b 
Alignment of objectives of different contracting parties 
abc-3 Cheng et al. 2000; Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy, 2008 
Collective/combined responsibility by a pre-selected group 
comprising one person from each major party 
abc-4 Chan et al., 2004; Halman and 
Braks, 1999 
Joint coordination and monitoring plans among contracting 
parties 
abc-5 Chan et al., 2004; Yeung et al., 
2007 
Clearly defined equitable risk-sharing arrangement among 
contracting parties 
abc-6 Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2002; 
Ling et al., 2006b 
Flexible/adjustable contracts to address uncertainties abc-7 Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2005 
Commitment level of contracting parties to joint problem 
solving 
abc-8 Chan et al., 2004; Chen and Chen, 
2007 
Presence of conducive learning climate/environment abc-9 Chan et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2006 
Acceptance of dispute resolution mechanism for the project 
abc-10 Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 
2004a, 2004b 
Clarity of contract conditions (e.g. scope of contract, duties & 
responsibilities) 
abc-11 Wong and Cheung, 2005 
Real gain-share/pain-share among contracting parties abc-12 Black et al., 2000; Ling et al., 2006b 
Effectiveness of team-building events used in the project abc-13 Cheng and Li, 2001, 2002 
Note: a, b, and c in code column refer to client, contractor, and consultant, respectively. 
Table 2: Characteristics of Respondents 
Characteristic Beijing Hong Kong 





< 5 years 8 14 3 6 
5-9 years 14 24 4 8 
10-14 years 22 38 6 12 
≥ 15 years 14 24 37 74 
Average 11 22 
Min 2 3 
Max 30 56 
Organization 
type 
Government 10 18 15 29 
Engineering firm 1 2 3 6 
Architectural firm 10 18 0 0 
Quantity surveying 
firm 
5 9 3 6 
Contractor 32 57 27 53 




Public 30 52 23 45 
Private 13 22 27 53 
Joint Venture 15 26 1 2 
Average of public 
percentage 
45 50 
Size of total 
workforce 
< 100 12 21 2 4 
100-999 23 40 17 35 
≥ 1000 22 39 30 61 
Average 19934 3097 
Min 25 10 
Max 160000 50000 
Table 3: Extent of Differences between Beijing and Hong Kong 
Code 
Beijing Hong Kong ANOVA 
Mean T Sig. Mean T Sig. F Sig. 
Cost (Y1) 10.42% 2.866 0.006 12.50% 4.535 0.000 0.198 0.657 
Time (Y2) 8.41% 1.904 0.062 17.78% 5.213 0.000 2.721 0.102 
Quality 
(Y3) 3.19 3.296 0.002 3.98 11.364 0.000 62.222 0.000 
Client 
Satisfaction 
(Y4) 3.32 3.777 0.000 3.88 9.656 0.000 20.087 0.000 
a-6 3.56 3.795 0.000 4.28 9.456 0.000 12.839 0.001 
a-8 3.16 1.219 0.228 3.87 7.258 0.000 15.415 0.000 
a-9 3.07 0.482 0.632 3.77 5.468 0.000 11.303 0.001 
a-16 3.32 2.746 0.008 3.87 6.317 0.000 9.387 0.003 
b-9 3.45 4.259 0.000 3.90 7.019 0.000 7.587 0.007 
b-13 3.44 3.605 0.001 3.88 5.831 0.000 5.315 0.023 
c-9 3.26 2.668 0.010 3.63 4.555 0.000 4.838 0.030 
ab-8 3.69 5.680 0.000 3.24 1.900 0.063 6.232 0.014 
bc-1 3.04 0.256 0.799 3.56 4.288 0.000 7.113 0.009 
bc-6 3.13 1.044 0.301 3.53 3.400 0.001 4.334 0.040 
abc-1 3.29 2.664 0.010 3.92 8.267 0.000 15.995 0.000 
abc-4 3.66 7.519 0.000 3.14 1.188 0.241 12.777 0.001 
abc-13 3.43 4.236 0.000 3.06 0.375 0.709 4.145 0.044 
 




Cost (Y1) Time (Y2) Quality (Y3) 
Satisfaction 
(Y4) 
Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. 
bc-7 2.93     0.316 0.019   
a-1 2.96     0.267 0.047   
a-17 3.05     0.299 0.026   
bc-6 3.13       0.295 0.029 
c-17 3.16     0.275 0.041   
a-8 3.16 -0.290 0.035       
b-1 3.18     0.386 0.003 0.358 0.007 
ac-7 3.25       -0.271 0.043 
abc-10 3.27*   -0.280 0.040     
abc-1 3.29*       0.358 0.006 
a-16 3.32* -0.273 0.048       
bc-5 3.33*   0.371 0.007   0.299 0.026 
c-2 3.33*   -0.290 0.037     
bc-3 3.36*       0.305 0.022 
a-5 3.36*     0.290 0.030   
bc-8 3.41*       0.310 0.023 
a-14 3.43*   -0.382 0.005     
b-13 3.44*     0.267 0.048   
b-9 3.45*     0.325 0.015 0.280 0.037 
abc-11 3.47* -0.309 0.022       
ab-5 3.48*       0.348 0.009 
ac-5 3.50*     0.306 0.022   
b-5 3.61*   -0.287 0.039     
c-15 3.63* -0.277 0.045       
a-12 3.68* -0.341 0.015       
b-6 3.72*     0.274 0.045   
b-4 3.73*       0.294 0.028 
b-8 3.75*       0.270 0.044 
b-2 3.77*     0.416 0.001   
b-15 3.82*   -0.422 0.002 0.331 0.013   
c-12 3.82*   -0.386 0.005 0.307 0.020   
b-12 3.98*   -0.308 0.026     
Total 5 8 13 11 
Note: * significant at p<0.050 based on t test of the mean results 
Table 5: Correlation of RC Practices to Project Performance in Hong Kong 
RC 
Practices 
Mean Cost (Y1) Time (Y2) Quality (Y3) 
Satisfaction 
(Y4) 
Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. 
abc-6 2.82 -0.300 0.038 -0.349 0.015     
ab-7 3.00 -0.398 0.006 -0.318 0.031   0.386 0.006 
abc-13 3.06   -0.347 0.016   0.351 0.011 
ac-7 3.12 -0.435 0.005     0.372 0.014 
a-10 3.13   -0.374 0.012     
bc-7 3.14       0.316 0.039 
abc-4 3.14       0.375 0.007 
c-11 3.20     0.385 0.014 0.329 0.038 
ac-8 3.20     0.332 0.028 0.323 0.032 
a-5 3.21   -0.376 0.012     
c-10 3.25 -0.431 0.007     0.348 0.028 
c-5 3.30* -0.367 0.023 -0.415 0.010     
abc-10 3.31* -0.312 0.031       
a-4 3.32*       0.295 0.044 
bc-2 3.37*       0.305 0.047 
a-17 3.40*       0.311 0.033 
ab-2 3.43*       0.305 0.033 
ab-6 3.43*       0.295 0.039 
abc-2 3.44*     0.317 0.025   
b-11 3.45*     0.359 0.011 0.324 0.023 
ab-3 3.45*       0.342 0.016 
ab-5 3.47*   -0.317 0.032   0.352 0.013 
c-4 3.50* -0.323 0.048   0.331 0.037 0.349 0.027 
abc-3 3.50* -0.421 0.003 -0.409 0.004   0.311 0.028 
b-1 3.51*       0.417 0.003 
c-1 3.51*     0.345 0.027   
a-14 3.52*     0.367 0.012   
b-17 3.53*     0.300 0.036 0.292 0.042 
c-2 3.53*       0.325 0.040 
c-16 3.53* -0.443 0.005   0.456 0.003 0.507 0.001 
ab-1 3.53*   -0.328 0.026     
bc-6 3.53*     0.355 0.019 0.437 0.003 
b-10 3.55*       0.309 0.031 
c-13 3.60*       0.326 0.040 
ab-4 3.61*     0.291 0.042   
c-9 3.63* -0.322 0.048   0.315 0.048 0.392 0.012 
c-14 3.65* -0.499 0.001   0.418 0.007 0.403 0.010 
bc-4 3.65*       0.358 0.018 
b-5 3.67*       0.318 0.026 
a-15 3.68*       0.347 0.017 
RC 
Practices 
Mean Cost (Y1) Time (Y2) Quality (Y3) 
Satisfaction 
(Y4) 
Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. 
c-15 3.70* -0.354 0.029   0.333 0.036 0.371 0.018 
ac-1 3.73*   -0.387 0.012     
abc-11 3.76*   -0.320 0.027     
a-9 3.77* -0.339 0.025       
b-16 3.80*       0.412 0.003 
a-8 3.87*   -0.320 0.034     
a-16 3.87* -0.362 0.016 -0.343 0.023 0.383 0.008 0.383 0.008 
b-9 3.90*       0.316 0.027 
abc-1 3.92*     0.332 0.017   
b-12 3.96*     0.360 0.011 0.406 0.004 
c-12 3.97* -0.414 0.010       
a-12 4.02*   -0.382 0.010     
b-8 4.02*       0.444 0.001 
b-14 4.02* -0.310 0.036   0.490 0.000 0.452 0.001 
b-15 4.02*     0.333 0.019 0.377 0.008 
b-2 4.06*       0.294 0.041 
Total 16 14 19 39 
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Figure 1: RC practices that need more emphasis 
Note: Refer to Table 1 for descriptions of the codes 
Figure 1
Click here to download Figure: Figure 1.pdf 
 
Figure 2: Framework to Better Manage Public Projects in Beijing 
Notes: 1) Refer to Table 1 for descriptions of the codes; 
2) Italicized and underlined items are key RC practices identified in Table 4 
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Consultant 
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Figure 3: Framework to Better Manage Public Projects in Hong Kong 
Notes: 1) Refer to Table 1 for descriptions of the codes; 
2) Italicized and underlined items are key RC practices identified in Table 5 
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Construction Projects in China 
 
Note: When referencing line numbers, please refer to the “tracked change” version of the 
revised manuscript. 
 
No. Comments Responses 
1 In their revision, the 




significance and concisely 
reorganize them in a short 
statement to be included 
in the "characteristics of 
the sample" section. 
The authors have 
addressed the majority of 
the reviewer's comments, 
except for the one about 
the statistical significance. 
More discussion on the 
statistical significance and 
validity of the sample is 
required. Is the sample 
statistically significant or 
not? The reviewer 
acknowledges the 
authors' response; 
however, the population 
size could be estimated to 
address this point.  
We agree with the handling editor and Reviewer #6 that 
it is desirable to know if the sample is statistical 
significant or not.  This could have been done through 
estimating the confidence interval for the proportion of 
public projects was calculated using the equation below. 
 
zα/2 = L√n                 
  0.5 
 Where: 
zα/2 is the number for which P(Z > zα/2) = α/2.   
L is the distance of extension on each side of the 
sample proportion 
n is the sample size. 
  
Unfortunately, we could not estimate L because the 
population size could not be estimated.  This is because 
the population is defined as “completed public projects 
in China” (see lines xx – xx), without defining the start 
and end dates, and the minimum project values.  The 
questionnaire also did not ask respondents to state the 
start and end dates of their projects.    
 
Notwithstanding this, we suggest that the samples are 
valid for these reasons.   
The first is the general convention that when 
n>30, the central limit theorem holds true.  The 
second reason is that questionnaires were sent to 
all the public offices in Beijing and Hong Kong 
that manage public construction projects.  No 
public office had been deliberately left out.  
Thirdly, high Cronbach’s alpha values of 0.832 to 
0.938 were obtained, suggesting high internal 
consistency.  See lines xx – xx. 
 
We have now also added another limitation of study:  
The population size could not be estimated, and 
hence the significance of the sample could not be 
determined mathematically.  See lines xx – xx. 
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No. Comments Responses 
2 Also, some discussion 
should be provided to 
explain the significantly 
different response rates 
among the Beijing and the 
Hong Kong samples.  
A statement was added in the "characteristics of the 
sample" section in lines 222-229: 
Many more samples were identified in Hong 
Kong than in Beijing because Hong Kong has 
more easily available published information of 
names of public officials and private contractors 
and consultants. However, this collection 
comprised a mix of private firms that had and did 
not have experience in public projects. As the 
questionnaire instructed those without experience 
in public sector projects not to reply, even though 
more questionnaires were sent out in Hong Kong, 
the fact that there are fewer public sector projects 
in Hong Kong compared to Beijing explains the 
lower response rate in Hong Kong. 
3 In addition, the reviewer 
strongly recommends 
revisiting the whole 
manuscript to enhance 
the conciseness of the 
writing. The paper could 
be significantly shortened 
without compromising its 
message. 
We have gone through the whole manuscript and 
deleted some paragraphs without compromising its 





































































Key Relational Contracting Practices Affecting the Performance of Public 1 
Construction Projects in China 2 
 3 
Florence Y.Y. Ling1, Yongjian Ke2, Mohan M. Kumaraswamy, M.ASCE3, and 4 
ShouQing Wang4 5 
 6 
Abstract 7 
Relational contracting (RC) is based on the recognition of mutual benefits and win-8 
win scenarios that are achieved through more cooperative relationships among the 9 
contracting parties in a project. While RC principles are less difficult to apply in 10 
private sector projects, it has not been established if public sector projects can enjoy 11 
the full benefits of RC. This study aims to investigate the effective RC practices that 12 
are found in China’s public construction projects. The specific objectives are to: (1) 13 
evaluate project performance levels in terms of cost, time, quality and client 14 
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satisfaction; (2) investigate the extent to which RC practices were adopted; and (3) 15 
identify the RC practices that lead to better performance. Due to the large 16 
geographical area of China, the surveys conducted were confined to Beijing and 17 
Hong Kong. A structured questionnaire was designed to collect qualitative data. The 18 
results show that: (1) public construction projects achieved significant success in 19 
quality performance and client satisfaction but not in budget and schedule 20 
performance; and (2) RC practices were adopted to varying extents in public projects. 21 
The findings contribute to knowledge by identifying the specific RC practices that 22 
could boost project performance significantly. Another contribution to knowledge is 23 
the discovery that the Relational Contract Theory is applicable to public projects 24 
notwithstanding the need to keep relations at arm’s length. A framework to manage 25 
public projects using the RC approach is recommended for adoption in Hong Kong 26 
and other countries that adopt project management style along PMI’s framework. A 27 
different framework is recommended for adoption in Beijing and places that have a 28 
centrally planned and controlled economic system so as to help public projects 29 
achieve better project performance. 30 
 31 
Subject headings: Relational Contracting, Public Construction Projects, Strategy, 32 







































































Relationships among contracting parties include formal transactions and relational 37 
links. Formal contracts spell out the rights, responsibilities, and liabilities of the 38 
parties concerned. In a formal contract, parties act in an atomized manner, looking 39 
out for their own personal interests (Williamson, 1975). Relational contracting (RC) is 40 
based on the recognition of mutual benefits and win-win scenarios that are achieved 41 
through more cooperative approaches, such as partnering, alliancing, joint venturing, 42 
long-term contracting, joint risk-sharing mechanisms, integrated project delivery, and 43 
other collaborative working arrangements (Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004a; AIA, 44 
2007). While RC principles are less difficult to apply in projects initiated by the private 45 
sector (Kumaraswamy, 2010), the gap in knowledge is that it is not known if public 46 
sector projects can also enjoy the full benefits of RC, such as risk and cost reduction, 47 
and better project performance (Akintoye and Main, 2007).  48 
 49 
The term “RC practices” in this paper refers to “relational practices” or practices 50 
based on good relationship management, which are RC-type or RC-based, even 51 





































































China is a legitimate geographical region to investigate, as seen in many previous 54 
studies (examples are: Lu et al., 2008; Tai et al, 2009; Chan et al., 2009a; Zhao et al., 55 
2011). Due to its strong economic growth and need for national development, there 56 
are many opportunities for architectural, engineering and construction (A/E/C) firms 57 
to operate in China’s construction industry. However, the Chinese market is full of 58 
pitfalls as well. It is fragmented, heterogeneous, risky and highly competitive (Chen 59 
and Messner, 2009). To perform well in the Chinese market, knowledge of the types 60 
of RC practices that lead to project success may be important. Hence, the aim of this 61 
study is to investigate effective RC practices in China’s public construction projects. 62 
The specific objectives are to: (1) evaluate public project performance levels in terms 63 
of cost, time, quality, and client satisfaction; (2) investigate the extent to which RC 64 
practices are adopted; and (3) identify the RC practices that lead to better 65 
performance of public projects in China. 66 
 67 
Due to China’s large geographical area, the scope of this study is confined to public 68 
construction projects in Beijing and Hong Kong. The capital city of Beijing was 69 
chosen for study as it has a significant number of completed public projects for the 70 




































































economy operates. Hong Kong, a former British colony and now a Special 72 
Administrative Region, was chosen for study because its construction practices are 73 
closer to those of A/E/C firms that operate in free market economies. The geographic 74 
specific findings of Beijing and Hong Kong could be applied to centrally planned 75 
economies and free market economies, respectively, in the context of the broader 76 
global community. The contrast between practices in Beijing and Hong Kong helps 77 
A/E/C firms that are currently operating in a free market economy and planning to 78 
enter a centrally planned market to better understand the differences between the 79 
RC practices in different markets. Particular attention could be paid to the key RC 80 
practices identified in this study to help them achieve better project outcomes. 81 
 82 
In the next section, a literature review of project performance and RC practices is 83 
presented and the knowledge gaps are identified. The research design and data 84 
analysis method are then explained, followed by the presentation of the 85 
characteristics of the sample. Next, the extent to which RC practices are adopted in 86 
Beijing and Hong Kong are compared and discussed, and key RC practices that lead 87 
to better project performance are identified. The last section summarizes the findings 88 






































































Literature Review 92 
 93 
Operationalizing Project Performance 94 
 95 
Project outcomes are multi-faceted. These include the traditional triple project 96 
outcomes (time, cost, and quality), safety performance, environmental performance, 97 
stakeholder satisfaction, and profitability. For this study, project outcome is viewed 98 
from the perspective of project delivery and organizational level competency. For 99 
project delivery competency, this research adopts the traditional triple project 100 
outcomes as the performance metrics, following Konchar and Sanvido (1998). For 101 
organizational level competency, service quality is operationalized as client 102 
satisfaction with the project, following Ling et al. (2004). 103 
 104 
RC Practices Affecting Project Performance 105 
 106 
Different aspects of RC have been covered in previous studies. These include 107 
drivers (Chan et al., 2003), obstacles (Glagola and Sheedy, 2002), success factors 108 




































































2001), communication (Bayliss et al., 2004), and performance index (Yeung et al., 110 
2007). This study postulates that there are certain RC practices that significantly 111 
affect the performance of public construction projects in China. RC practices were 112 
identified from the literature review and summarized in Table 1. For brevity, these 113 
practices are coded as “a”, “b” and “c” for client, contractor, and consultant, 114 
respectively, followed by a reference number. These RC practices are divided into 115 
three categories: (1) individual organizational features and practices adopted by 116 
each contracting party (coded as a-#, b-# and c-#); (2) practices adopted in tandem 117 
by two of the contracting parties (coded as ab-#, ac-# and bc-#); and (3) practices 118 
adopted by all the major contracting parties in unison (code: abc-#). “#” represents 119 
the reference number of the RC practice. 120 
 121 
<Insert Table 1 here.> 122 
 123 
Knowledge Gaps 124 
 125 
The Relational Contract Theory views contracts more as relations rather than as 126 
discrete transactions and thus, all transactions involve a wider social and economic 127 




































































spectrum ranging from “discrete” through to “relational”. The theory challenges the 129 
traditional premise that all contracts are mere transactions, and emphasizes the role 130 
of norms in determining the manner in which commercial exchanges operate in 131 
practice. These norms are further operationalized into RC approaches/practices. 132 
 133 
The brief literature review revealed that previous studies on RC approaches did not 134 
differentiate between public and private construction projects. Whether RC principles 135 
could be applied successfully and specifically to public construction projects remains 136 
unclear.  137 
 138 
Public projects merit an in-depth study because public clients are usually not in the 139 
position to offer future relationship incentives since most projects must be procured 140 
through the competitive bidding process, and government regulations traditionally 141 
discourage close relationships between public clients and private contracting parties 142 
(Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2004b). Yet, public projects are highly visible and need 143 
to achieve the triple project goals because taxpayers’ money is involved.  144 
 145 
The link between the adoption of RC practices and project outcomes is also not 146 




































































Relational Contract Theory to public contracts through exploring RC practices that 148 
may boost the performance of public projects in China significantly. 149 
 150 
Research Method 151 
 152 
A large study had been conducted on RC practices and the drivers of and barriers to 153 
relational contracts, as well as how these affect the performance of public 154 
construction projects in China, Australia, and Singapore. This paper reports a part of 155 
the study, focusing on RC practices and project outcomes in China. 156 
 157 
Research Design 158 
 159 
The questionnaire-survey is the adopted choice of research design for this study. 160 
The survey was conducted between June and November 2011 in Beijing and Hong 161 
Kong. The objectives of the survey that are relevant to this paper are twofold: (1) to 162 
evaluate the performance outcomes of completed public construction projects; and 163 
(2) to determine the extent to which RC practices were present, observed, practiced 164 





































































The unit of analysis in this study is a completed public sector project, regardless of 167 
the extent to which RC approaches were adopted. The target population is thus 168 
completed public projects in China, and the sampling frame is hence completed 169 
public projects in Beijing and Hong Kong. In order to collect the data, multiple 170 
stakeholders comprising public sector clients and consultants, private sector 171 
consultants (e.g. architects, engineers, quantity surveyors, and project managers), 172 
and contractors, who had been involved in public construction projects in Beijing and 173 
Hong Kong, were approached. However, due to the lack of a national registry of 174 
officials/firms involved in public construction projects, the contact details of public 175 
officials were obtained from government directories. Questionnaires were then sent 176 
to all of them because the number is not large. The contact details of private 177 
consultants and contractors were derived from the respective professional and trade 178 
institutions, and randomly selected. As this group may contain those who have not 179 
handled public projects before, the questionnaire clearly stated that only those who 180 
had completed public projects should fill up the questionnaire. 181 
 182 
Data were collected using a specially designed structured questionnaire. Section A of 183 
the questionnaire requested information on the completed public sector project and 184 




































































client satisfaction (Y4). Y1 and Y2 were measured more objectively as percentage of 186 
time and cost over/under run. Y3 measured quality of output, stated as 187 
product/output quality of the facility/project. Y4 measured quality of service, stated as 188 
client satisfaction with the contracting parties’ service quality. Service quality 189 
measures the transformation process (i.e. the service) from resources to the 190 
constructed facility. Y3 and Y4 were relatively subjective and thus rated on a five-191 
point Likert scale (1 = Very dissatisfied, 3 = Neutral, 5 = Very satisfied). In Section B, 192 
respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which RC practices were adopted 193 
on a five-point Likert scale (1 = Very low, 3 = Neutral, 5 = Very high). Respondents 194 
were also given the opportunity to provide other suggestions and demographic 195 
characteristics of themselves and their companies. The questionnaire was pilot 196 
tested and then translated into Chinese. 197 
 198 
Data Analysis Method 199 
 200 
The data were analyzed using SPSS software. The main statistical methods used 201 
were descriptive statistics, one-way ANOVA, one-sample t test and Pearson’s 202 
correlation analysis. The Confidence Interval (CI) was set at 0.95. One-way ANOVA 203 




































































RC practices were adopted in Beijing and Hong Kong. The one-sample t test 205 
procedure was performed on the four performance metrics (Y1 to Y4) and the RC 206 
practices to determine if the projects achieved significantly good performance and if 207 
the practices were adopted to a significant extent, respectively. To check whether a 208 
greater adoption of RC practices led to better project outcomes, Pearson’s 209 
correlation analysis was conducted. Each pair of variables in the Pearson’s 210 
correlation analysis comprised one of the four performance metrics and one of the 211 
RC practices. 212 
 213 
Characteristics of the sample 214 
 215 
Survey questionnaires were sent to 259 and 645 samples in Beijing and Hong Kong, 216 
respectively. 59 and 51 valid questionnaires were returned in Beijing and Hong Kong, 217 
representing response rates of 22.78% and 7.91%, respectively. Many more 218 
samples were identified in Hong Kong than in Beijing because Hong Kong has more 219 
easily available published information of names of public officials and private 220 
contractors and consultants. However, this collection comprised a mix of private firms 221 
that had and did not have experience in public projects. As the questionnaire 222 




































































more questionnaires were sent out in Hong Kong, the fact that there are fewer public 224 
sector projects in Hong Kong compared to Beijing explains the lower response rate 225 
in Hong Kong. 226 
 227 
As regards sample validity, it is observed that more than 30 sets of valid project data 228 
were received.  The general convention is that when n>30, the central limit theorem 229 
holds true.  Moreover, questionnaires were sent to all the public offices that manage 230 
public construction projects in Beijing and Hong Kong.  No public office had been 231 
deliberately left out.  Cronbach’s alpha values of three categories of RC practices in 232 
Beijing and Hong Kong ranged from 0.832 to 0.938, suggesting that the RC practices 233 
under each category have a high internal consistency (Nunnally, 1978). It is therefore 234 
concluded that these data are reliable and further statistical analyses may be 235 
conducted (Nunnally, 1978). 236 
 237 
The characteristics of the respondents are given in Table 2. All the respondents have 238 
extensive construction experience in various types of public construction projects. 239 
The Beijing and Hong Kong respondents had an average of 11 and 22 years of 240 
experience, respectively. The respondents’ firms engage an average of 19,934 and 241 




































































experience of the respondents as shown in Table 2, these respondents should be in 243 
a position to accurately assess the extent to which RC practices were present, 244 
observed, practiced or emphasized in the project. 245 
 246 
<Insert Table 2 here.> 247 
 248 
Result 1: Performance of Public Projects in Beijing and Hong Kong 249 
 250 
The first objective of this study is to evaluate project performance levels based on 251 
cost, time, quality, and client satisfaction. The t test results in Table 3 show that 252 
public construction projects in Beijing achieved significantly good performance in 253 
client satisfaction (3.32, p=0.000) and quality (3.19, p=0.002), but had significantly 254 
poor cost performance (10.42% cost overrun, p=0.006) and marginally failed in time 255 
performance (8.41% schedule overrun, p=0.062). Public construction projects in 256 
Hong Kong also achieved significantly good performance in client satisfaction (3.88, 257 
p=0.000) and quality (3.98, p=0.000), but their mean scores are significantly higher 258 
than those in Beijing. Similar to Beijing, the results show that public projects in Hong 259 
Kong had significantly poor cost performance (12.50%, p=0.000) and time 260 





































































<Insert Table 3 here.> 263 
 264 
Poor cost performance could have arose because of the prevalent practice of under 265 
bidding, hidden costs which surface only at the later stage, (Ling et al., 2006a) and 266 
inability to respond adequately to perceived change orders (Ling et al., 2008). Poor 267 
time performance may be due to Chinese clients changing the project scope and 268 
issuing too many change orders (Ling et al., 2006a). While changes were ordered on 269 
site, sometimes, the client’s top management may not approve them, giving rise to 270 
abortive work and further delays (Ling et al, 2006a). Project delays may also come 271 
about because of holdups in getting approvals (Ling et al, 2008). 272 
 273 
Result 2: RC Practices Adopted in Beijing and Hong Kong 274 
 275 
The second objective of this study is to investigate the extent to which RC practices 276 
were adopted in Beijing and Hong Kong using t test of the mean. The t test results in 277 
Tables 4 and 5 show that there are RC practices that had been adopted to a 278 
significant extent in Beijing and Hong Kong’s public projects. The finding suggests 279 




































































although these generally comprise discrete transactions with little opportunity for 281 
future exchanges. 282 
 283 
ANOVA results in Table 3 show that 13 practices were adopted to significantly 284 
different extents in Beijing and Hong Kong. Among these, 10 RC practices were used 285 
more frequently in Hong Kong, while only three practices were adopted more 286 
frequently in Beijing, indicating that RC concepts are generally more acceptable to 287 
contracting parties in public construction projects in Hong Kong. The implication is 288 
that A/E/C firms planning to penetrate a different type of market (e.g. centrally 289 
controlled economies versus free market economies) should pay particular attention 290 
to these 13 RC practices in order to gain an advantage over local firms. 291 
 292 
Public clients in Beijing adopted the following RC practices to a significantly lower 293 
extent compared to Hong Kong clients – strengthening their financial capacity (a-6); 294 
acquiring knowledge of project processes (a-8); committing to other parties on a 295 
long-term basis (a-9); and adopting a positive attitude toward continuous 296 
improvement (a-16). The results echoed Sachs et al.’s (2007) finding that some local 297 
governments in mainland China lack the relevant experience and knowledge in 298 




































































usually restrained by an inertia that may stem from beliefs such as “that is not our 300 
responsibility”, “there is no need to change current practices that are already good 301 
enough (or even better than others)”, or a “not invented here” syndrome 302 
(Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 2000). This inertia is more evident in Beijing 303 
than in Hong Kong, as the long-standing bureaucratic culture in mainland China has 304 
often been criticized for its lack of openness and flexibility (Piotrowski et al., 2009). In 305 
addition, unlike local governments in mainland China which suffer from a lack of 306 
funds, the Hong Kong government has adequate financial reserves and enjoys a 307 
budget surplus (Chan et al., 2009a). 308 
 309 
Table 3 shows that compared to Hong Kong, contractors in Beijing had significantly 310 
fewer opportunities to provide specific inputs on construction methods and materials 311 
before they were formally appointed (b-13). This may be due to the Hong Kong 312 
government’s more positive attitude toward promoting integration in the construction 313 
industry by encouraging contractors to give their feedback before they are formally 314 
appointed. 315 
 316 
Contracting parties in public construction projects in Beijing have lower levels of 317 




































































Beijing government has been investing heavily in infrastructure development and 319 
thus the market for public construction projects in Beijing is huge (BMBS, 2011). This 320 
market situation of high construction demand causes private firms in Beijing to 321 
disregard the need to have any long-term commitments with other parties.  322 
 323 
Compared to those in Hong Kong, contractors and consultants in Beijing are less 324 
familiar with each other (bc-1) and less likely to share information (bc-6). As Beijing’s 325 
construction market is six times larger than Hong Kong’s in terms of gross value of 326 
construction work (BMBS, 2011; CSD, 2011), it is therefore less likely for contractors 327 
and consultants in Beijing to have prior relationships. This lack of familiarity between 328 
contractors and consultants in Beijing may cause them to adopt a more adversarial 329 
stance with each other than those in Hong Kong, which could lead to lower 330 
enthusiasm to share project information. 331 
 332 
Table 3 shows that “Clarity of division of responsibilities among contracting parties” 333 
(abc-1) was rated significantly higher in Hong Kong than in Beijing. As public 334 
construction projects in Hong Kong adopt standard conditions of contract, the 335 
division of responsibilities is clearer than in Beijing, where in-house or bespoke 336 





































































“Level of reciprocation/face-saving gestures between the client and contractor” (ab-339 
8), “Collective/combined responsibility by a pre-selected group comprising one 340 
person from each major party” (abc-4) and “Effectiveness of team-building events 341 
used in the project” (abc-13) were rated significantly higher in Beijing than in Hong 342 
Kong. This may be attributed to the “guanxi” that exists in Chinese culture. Private 343 
participants in Beijing have to spend much more time and effort to cultivate guanxi 344 
with public clients than those in Hong Kong (Sachs et al., 2007). There are hence 345 
many entertainment activities that need to be carried out in order to cultivate and 346 
maintain good relationships with public clients in Beijing. In Hong Kong, this is not so 347 
pronounced because the government departments are inherited from the British, and 348 
these have well-defined responsibilities and codes of conduct. They are usually not 349 
allowed to participate in team-building events with private firms and cannot receive 350 
nor reciprocate favors. 351 
 352 
Result 3: RC Practices Affecting Project Outcomes 353 
 354 
The third objective of this study is to identify RC practices that lead to better project 355 




































































respectively, that are significantly correlated with performance metrics (Y1 to Y4) in 357 
an ascending order based on mean ratings. The mean ratings measure the extent to 358 
which the RC practices were adopted. Significant negative correlations with Y1 and 359 
Y2 and significant positive correlations with Y3 and Y4 suggest that when the RC 360 
practice is adopted to a larger extent, the project performance is also significantly 361 
better. Overall, 32 and 56 out of a total of 88 practices are significantly correlated 362 
with performance outcomes of public construction projects in Beijing and Hong Kong, 363 
respectively. The result indicates that RC principles have greater impact on the 364 
outcomes of public construction projects in Hong Kong than in Beijing. 365 
 366 
<Insert Tables 4 and 5 here.> 367 
 368 
Key RC practices are defined in this study as those significantly correlated with 369 
project performance but not adopted to a significant extent. As shown in Tables 4 370 
and 5, there were eight and 11 of these key RC practices in Beijing and Hong Kong, 371 
respectively. These RC practices are further depicted in Figure 1. The discussions in 372 
the following sub-sections focus on these key RC practices. 373 
 374 





































































RC practices affecting project performance significantly are depicted in Figures 2 377 
and 3 for Beijing and Hong Kong, respectively. It is suggested that contracting parties 378 
adopt these RC practices to a greater extent in future projects so as to achieve 379 
better project performance. In terms of generalizing the findings to the broader global 380 
community, Figure 2 is important for firms when investing in a centrally controlled 381 
economy like China, while Figure 3 is useful for adoption in a free market economy. 382 
 383 
<Insert Figures 2 and 3 here.> 384 
 385 
Cost Performance (Y1) 386 
 387 
Table 4 shows that the cost performance of public construction projects in Beijing is 388 
significantly correlated with five RC practices. On the other hand, there are 16 RC 389 
practices that are significantly correlated with the cost performance of public 390 
construction projects in Hong Kong (see Table 5). Among them, clients’ attitude 391 
toward continuous improvement (a-16) and consultants’ top management support for 392 
RC practices (c-15) are significantly correlated with cost performance in both Beijing 393 




































































toward, and support for, RC practices, especially from senior management, is 395 
important. 396 
 397 
Among the five RC practices in Beijing that are significantly correlated with cost 398 
performance, only one – client’s knowledge level of project processes (a-8) – was 399 
not adopted to a significant extent and hence needs to be highlighted. Clients’ lack of 400 
knowledge of project processes could lead to an inadequate brief and feasibility 401 
study or an inaccurate pre-tender estimate, which may eventually result in cost 402 
overrun (Ling and Leong, 2002). It is therefore recommended that public sector 403 
organizations capture the knowledge and information on project processes, products, 404 
and technology after a project is completed so that better project outcomes can be 405 
attained in future projects (Love et al., 2010). For the “one-off” type of client who 406 
develops only one project in a long while, it may not be worthwhile to acquire in-407 
depth construction knowledge. In this instance, choosing a reputable and 408 
knowledgeable consultant is suggested. 409 
 410 
Four RC practices in Hong Kong, i.e. “Clearly defined equitable risk-sharing 411 
arrangement among contracting parties” (abc-6), “Ongoing social relationships 412 




































































clients and consultants” (ac-7), and “Consultants’ previous experience in relational 414 
contracting approaches” (c-10), were not adopted to a significant extent yet had 415 
significant correlation with cost performance. This indicates that the RC practices 416 
need more attention. 417 
 418 
The respondents in Hong Kong regarded the practice “Clearly defined equitable risk-419 
sharing arrangement among contracting parties” (abc-6) as a key RC practice 420 
affecting cost and time performance, and this supports the view of Rahman and 421 
Kumaraswamy (2002). Yet, this practice was not adopted to a significant extent 422 
because the public sector’s standard conditions of contract drafted by public bodies 423 
may be biased toward the public client. 424 
 425 
Table 5 shows “Ongoing social relationships (e.g. “guanxi” and social ties outside of 426 
the project)” between clients and contractors/consultants (ab-7 and ac-7) are key RC 427 
practices because they were significantly correlated with cost performance, but not 428 
adopted to a significant extent. These mutual ongoing social relationships outside of 429 
the project between clients and other contracting parties do not commonly exist in 430 
public construction projects in Hong Kong. One explanation could be that the 431 




































































strict regulations, and competitive bidding is almost always required (Rahman and 433 
Kumaraswamy, 2004b). However, this study found that closer ongoing social 434 
relationships among contracting parties are significantly correlated with cost (Y1) and 435 
time performance (Y2), and client satisfaction (Y4). This could be attributed to the 436 
trust and friendship that are present in ongoing relationships, causing contracting 437 
parties to be more willing to compromise should problems arise and thus achieve 438 
better outcomes (Castro et al., 2009). The implication is that past and current 439 
relationships may be taken into account in the selection of contractors and 440 
consultants. 441 
 442 
Table 5 shows that consultants’ previous experience in RC approaches (c-10) is 443 
significantly correlated with cost performance (Y1) and client satisfaction (Y4), but 444 
not adopted to a significant extent in Hong Kong. As explained in the introduction, it 445 
is still not known if public sector projects can enjoy the full benefits of RC. It is 446 
understandable that consultants lack experience in RC approaches. 447 
 448 
Time Performance (Y2) 449 
 450 




































































construction projects in Beijing and eight RC practices (see Table 4), while 14 RC 452 
practices are significantly and negatively correlated with time performance in Hong 453 
Kong (see Table 5). There is no common practice in the two lists. In Beijing, 454 
contractors were involved in five out of eight RC practices, while in Hong Kong, 13 455 
out of 14 practices relate to clients. 456 
 457 
Table 4 shows that the eight RC practices that significantly affect time performance 458 
are all significantly adopted in past public construction projects in Beijing. This may 459 
be attributed to the Chinese government’s strong emphasis on the timely completion 460 
of public projects (Liu et al., 2010). It could also be observed in Table 3 that time 461 
overrun in Beijing’s public construction projects was not significant (t=1.904, 462 
p=0.062), which is consistent with the findings here. 463 
 464 
Among the 14 RC practices that are significantly correlated with time performance in 465 
Hong Kong, five practices were not adopted to a significant extent in past projects. 466 
These are: “Clearly defined equitable risk-sharing arrangement among contracting 467 
parties” (abc-6), “Effectiveness of team-building events used in the project” (abc-13), 468 
“Ongoing social relationships between clients and contractors” (ab-7), “Client has 469 




































































experience in RC approaches” (a-10). Practices abc-6 and ab-7 had significant 471 
correlation with both time performance (Y2) and cost performance (Y1) and have 472 
been discussed in the previous section. 473 
 474 
“Effectiveness of team-building events used in the project” (abc-13) was not 475 
significantly observed in past public construction projects in Hong Kong. However, as 476 
shown in Table 5, significant correlations were found with time performance (Y2) and 477 
client satisfaction (Y4). In Hong Kong, officials in public departments that are 478 
modeled after the British system are not allowed to participate in team-building 479 
events at an inter-personal level. Therefore, contracting parties would rely more on 480 
contractual arrangements to guard against trouble, and this rigidity may increase the 481 
time needed to execute a project and lead to delays. As team building in the early 482 
phases of a project was found to influence participants’ behavior and increase 483 
project knowledge (Kadefors, 2004), making more effort in team building is 484 
recommended (Diallo and Thuillier, 2005). 485 
 486 
The results show that clients’ “organizational culture fits RC practices” (a-5) and 487 
“previous experience in RC approaches” (a-10) were not adopted to a significant 488 




































































Chan and Kumaraswamy’s (1997) finding that client-initiated variation is one of the 490 
principal and common causes of delays in Hong Kong, especially when introduced 491 
mid-stream. Clients’ lack of an appropriate organizational culture that fits RC 492 
practices is the main reason for ineffective project partnering (Ng et al., 2002), and is 493 
more critical for public clients (Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy, 2000). 494 
 495 
Quality Performance (Y3) 496 
 497 
Quality performance of public construction projects in Beijing is significantly 498 
correlated with 13 RC practices. Five out of the 13 practices were not adopted to a 499 
significant extent in past public construction projects. On the other hand, 19 RC 500 
practices have significant correlation with quality performance in Hong Kong, and 501 
two of these were not adopted to a significant extent.  502 
 503 
Contractors’ top management support for RC practices (b-15) was significantly 504 
correlated with quality performance in both Beijing and Hong Kong. It is the senior 505 
management’s responsibility to set policies, control resources and train staff. RC is 506 
therefore unlikely to succeed without the backing of top management (Akintoye and 507 





































































Five out of the 13 RC practices that are significantly correlated with quality 510 
performance in Beijing were not adopted to a significant extent. These include: 511 
clients’ level of innovation/creativity (a-1) and investment in development of 512 
collaborative working skills (a-17), consultants’ investment in development of 513 
collaborative working skills (c-17), contractors’ level of innovation/creativity (b-1), and 514 
ongoing social relationships between contractors and consultants (bc-7). 515 
 516 
As clients are responsible for the preparation of clear and unambiguous 517 
specifications (Jha and Iyer, 2006), they play an important role in helping the project 518 
to achieve the desired quality level and need to be competent in defining the level of 519 
expected quality. This may explain why clients’ level of innovation/creativity (a-1) and 520 
investment in development of collaborative working skills (a-17) had significant 521 
correlation with quality performance. However, public clients in Beijing are usually 522 
infrequent clients or “one-off” clients (Ke et al., 2011), who are unable to be 523 
innovative and are not motivated to develop collaborative working skills because 524 
they do not have a demand for construction products on a regular basis. 525 
 526 




































































not significantly adopted in Beijing, yet had significant impact on quality performance. 528 
Zhao et al. (2011) also found that modern project management tools and techniques 529 
have not been extensively adopted by consultants in China’s construction industry. 530 
Under such an environment, it is understandable that consultants do not invest much 531 
in the development of collaborative working skills in Beijing. As consultants are 532 
important links between clients and contractors, a higher level of collaborative 533 
working skills of consultants would increase the interaction among project 534 
participants, improve mutual understanding and information sharing, and thereafter 535 
boost quality performance (Jha and Iyer, 2006). 536 
 537 
Contractors’ level of innovation/creativity (b-1) showed a significant correlation with 538 
quality performance, perhaps due to its impact on the contractors’ operations and 539 
output (Yasamis et al., 2002). Consistent with the low contribution rate of science 540 
and technology to China’s construction industry (Lu et al., 2008), contractors in 541 
Beijing may be unwilling to invest in innovation because of the uncertain outcome. 542 
 543 
Ongoing social relationships between contractors and consultants (bc-7) engender 544 
good communication, thereby facilitating proper monitoring and timely feedback, 545 




































































poor workmanship or improper usage of resources to be reported promptly, and this 547 
aids in achieving the desired quality level (Jha and Iyer, 2006). 548 
 549 
In Hong Kong, consultants’ readiness to compromise on unclear issues (c-11) and 550 
the level of reciprocation/face-saving gestures between clients and consultants (ac-8) 551 
are key RC practices that are significantly correlated with quality performance (Y3) 552 
and client satisfaction (Y4). Currently the Hong Kong government uses a two-553 
envelope system (i.e. technical aspects of the proposal in one envelope and 554 
consulting fees in the other) for consultant selection (Baark and Wai, 2000). It is 555 
therefore difficult for the client to make a reciprocation /face-saving gesture and 556 
directly employ a consultant. Meanwhile, the readiness to compromise on unclear 557 
issues is perceived to be an important factor in implementing RC principles (Rahman 558 
and Kumaraswamy, 2004a). This is more so for consultants, as they prepare 559 
specifications and drawings that are usually far from perfect, and so, compromises 560 
on unclear issues need to be made by consultants in order to improve quality 561 
performance.  562 
 563 





































































Table 4 shows that client satisfaction is significantly correlated with 11 RC practices 566 
in Beijing. As shown in Table 5, 39 RC practices have significant correlation with 567 
client satisfaction in Hong Kong. The large difference between the numbers of 568 
correlated practices in these two cities may to some extent reflect the greater 569 
emphasis and expectation of collaborative behaviors in Hong Kong. Six RC practices 570 
were common to both Beijing and Hong Kong. These include three individual 571 
features and practices adopted by contractors, and three mutual practices among 572 
contracting parties. The former are: “Level of innovation/creativity” (b-1), “Knowledge 573 
level of project processes” (b-8), and “Long-term commitment level” (b-9). The latter 574 
are: “Sharing of project information between contractor and consultant” (bc-6), 575 
“Ongoing social relationships between clients and consultants” (ac-7), and “Level of 576 
inter-personal relations/cultural harmony between clients and contractors” (ab-5). 577 
 578 
In Beijing, three out of the six RC practices affecting client satisfaction (b-1, bc-6, ac-579 
7) were not adopted to a significant extent. b-1 has been discussed in the previous 580 
section.  581 
 582 
The sharing of project information between contractors and consultants (bc-6) would 583 




































































identify potential conflicts, leading to higher client satisfaction. However, each party 585 
in mainland China tends to treat information as confidential rather than something to 586 
be shared. This is to prevent its own interests from being compromised as there is 587 
conflict of interests among the participants, especially between contractors and 588 
consultants (Tai et al., 2009).  589 
 590 
The reason why “Ongoing social relationship between clients and consultants” (ac-7) 591 
was not significantly adopted in Beijing may be attributed to the current procurement 592 
system, which was discussed above. It is worth noting that there is a significant 593 
negative correlation between Beijing’s client satisfaction and the ongoing 594 
relationships between clients and consultants, which is a direct contrast to Hong 595 
Kong. Zuo and Ma (2007) found that one of the major issues in China’s consultancy 596 
industry is that the responsibilities of consultants are usually not clearly defined. Due 597 
to the ongoing social relationships between clients and consultants, they may have 598 
signed a loose contract where the responsibilities of consultants are not clearly spelt 599 
out. Clients could thereafter be less satisfied. 600 
 601 
Table 5 shows that eight RC practices that significantly affect client satisfaction were 602 




































































practices of consultants, four mutual practices, and two joint practices. The two 604 
individual features and practices of consultants are: “Previous experience in RC 605 
approaches” (c-10) and “Readiness to compromise on unclear issues” (c-11). The 606 
four mutual practices are: “Ongoing social relationships” among contracting parties 607 
(ab-7, ac-7 & bc-7) and “Level of reciprocation/face-saving gestures between clients 608 
and consultants” (ac-8). The two joint practices are: “Collective/combined 609 
responsibility by a pre-selected group comprising one person from each major party” 610 
(abc-4) and “Effectiveness of team-building events used in the project” (abc-13). 611 
Among them, practices c-10, c-11, ab-7, ac-7, ac-8, and abc-13 have significant 612 
correlation with other performance indexes, which has been discussed above. 613 
 614 
Ongoing social relationships among contracting parties (ab-7, ac-7 & bc-7) were 615 
found to be significantly correlated with client satisfaction in Hong Kong. This is 616 
consistent with Castro et al.’s (2009) finding that construction companies form 617 
coalitions principally on the basis of past or current relationships. 618 
 619 
“Collective/combined responsibility by a pre-selected group comprising one person 620 
from each major party” (abc-4) is currently not a common behavior in Hong Kong. An 621 




































































in fostering confidence among the contracting parties (Chan et al., 2009b). However, 623 
the facilitator would not be involved throughout the whole life of the project. 624 
Therefore, a joint group comprising at least one person from each party is not 625 




This study investigated RC practices that are adopted in public construction projects 630 
in China. Using a structured questionnaire, data were collected from experienced 631 
contracting parties who had been personally involved in public construction projects 632 
in Beijing and Hong Kong. The statistical analysis revealed that public construction 633 
projects in both cities had achieved significantly good quality performance and client 634 
satisfaction but not in budget and schedule performance. However, public 635 
construction projects in Hong Kong achieved significantly better performance in 636 
owner satisfaction and quality than those in Beijing.   637 
 638 
The main findings (see Tables 4 and 5) are: 32 and 56 RC practices are significantly 639 
correlated with the performance outcomes of public construction projects in Beijing 640 




































































Hong Kong, respectively, are key practices as they are not adopted to a significant 642 
extent but are significantly correlated with performance outcomes. The unique value 643 
of the findings to the construction engineering and management community is the 644 
identification of a list of key RC practices which could be adopted as they lead to 645 
better project outcomes. Some of these key RC practices are: having collective 646 
responsibility comprising one person from each major contracting party; sharing risks 647 
equitably among contracting parties; organizing effective team-building events; 648 
sharing project information among contracting parties; developing collaborative 649 
working skills; and compromising on unclear issues. 650 
 651 
Another main finding is that 13 practices were adopted to significantly different 652 
extents in Hong Kong and Beijing. To generalize the findings to the broader global 653 
community, to a limited extent, the findings from Hong Kong may be applicable to 654 
countries that adopt the open market economy, while those from Beijing may be 655 
implemented by countries that adopt a planned economy. Hong Kong’s open market 656 
is indicated by its global competitiveness rank of 11 out of 142 countries, which is 657 
comparable to the US and UK’s rankings of 5th and 10th respectively, and ahead of 658 
Australia’s 20th placing (World Economic Forum, 2011).  As for Beijing, its planned 659 




































































directs and controls a large share of the country’s economic output. The central 661 
planning extends to allocation of workload through administrative orders (Zhang, 662 
2003). The implications of the findings for the global communities that adopt project 663 
management style along PMI’s (2008) framework are: they should have better 664 
division of responsibilities among contracting parties; share more project information; 665 
and have long-term commitment to the project. On the other hand, in planned 666 
economies, RC practices that are adopted to a significantly larger extent are having 667 
combined responsibility comprising one person from each major contracting party, 668 
and organizing effective team-building events.  669 
 670 
The results show that public projects in China had adopted many RC practices 671 
among contracting parties to a significant extent, such as alignment of objectives, 672 
joint coordination and monitoring of plans, and joint problem solving. The findings 673 
contribute to the body of knowledge by showing that the Relational Contract Theory 674 
is valid for public projects even though they are procured through open bidding, and 675 
hence do not lend themselves to future relationships. The implication is that A/E/C 676 
firms should approach public projects with a relational mindset and not view them as 677 
discrete transactions just because the public sector uses open bidding. Another 678 




































































it leads to better project outcomes. 680 
 681 
One limitation faced in this study is that correlation does not mean causation. 682 
Therefore the results should be interpreted carefully. Correlation statistics should not 683 
be taken as conclusive evidence that those RC practices are definitely the most 684 
appropriate ones to be adopted. Secondly, the findings are not easily generalized to 685 
different regions in China, as the public projects that were used to inform this 686 
research were from Beijing and Hong Kong only. Finally, the population size could 687 
not be estimated, and hence the significance of the sample could not be determined 688 
mathematically.  In future studies, data from other regions in China could be 689 
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Table 1: Features and Practices Identified 




Level of innovation/creativity a-1, b-1, c-1 Chan et al., 2004; Cheng et al., 
2000 
Commitment of resources to the project a-2, b-2, c-2 Cheng et al., 2000; Chen and Chen, 
2007 
Effort in implementing relational contracting practices a-3, b-3, c-3 Black et al., 2000; Chen and Chen, 
2007 
Acceptance of relational contracting practices a-4, b-4, c-4 Black et al., 2000; Kumaraswamy et 
al., 2005b 
Organizational culture fit to relational contracting practices a-5, b-5, c-5 Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 
2004a, 2004b 
Financial capacity a-6, b-6, c-6 Black et al., 2000; Chen and Chen, 
2007 
Flexibility when situations change a-7, b-7, c-7 Chen and Chen, 2007; Ling et al., 
2006b 
Knowledge level of project processes a-8, b-8, c-8 Cheng et al., 2000; Love et al., 
2010 
Long-term commitment level a-9, b-9, c-9 Cheng et al., 2000 
Previous experience in relational contracting approaches a-10, b-10, c-10 Kumaraswamy et al., 2005a, b; 
Readiness to compromise on unclear issues a-11, b-11, c-11 Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 
2004a, b 
Reputation in the industry a-12, b-12, c-12 Powell, 1990; Gulati and Gargiulo, 
1999 
Specific inputs on construction methods, materials, etc, 
before they were formally appointed 
a-13, b-13, c-13 Bayliss et al., 2004; Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy, 2004b 
Team working attitude a-14, b-14, c-14 Black et al., 2000; Chen and Chen, 
2007 





















































Attitude toward continuous improvement a-16, b-16, c-16 Black et al., 2000; Chen and Chen, 
2007 






Familiarity/previous relationships  ab-1, ac-1, bc-1 Gulati, 1999; Zaheer and Soda, 
2009 
Mutual trust  ab-2, ac-2, bc-2 Xu et al., 2005; Kumaraswamy, et 
al., 2005b 
Mutual understanding  ab-3, ac-3, bc-3 Black, 2000; Love et al., 2010 
Open and effective communication  ab-4, ac-4, bc-4 Chen and Chen, 2007; Doloi, 2009 
Level of inter-personal relations/cultural harmony (individual 
level)  
ab-5, ac-5, bc-5 Kumaraswamy et al., 2005a; 
Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2008 
Sharing of project information  ab-6, ac-6, bc-6 Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003; Maurer 
and Ebers 2006 
Ongoing social relationships (e.g. “guanxi”, social ties, and 
kinship outside of this project)  
ab-7, ac-7, bc-7 Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Castro et 
al., 2009 





Clarity of division of responsibilities among contracting 
parties 
abc-1 Anvuur and Kumaraswamy, 2007; 
Halman and Braks, 1999 
Acceptance of performance appraisal mechanism for the 
project 
abc-2 Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 
2004a, b 
Alignment of objectives of different contracting parties 
abc-3 Cheng et al. 2000; Rahman and 
Kumaraswamy, 2008 
Collective/combined responsibility by a pre-selected group 
comprising one person from each major party 
abc-4 Chan et al., 2004; Halman and 
Braks, 1999 
Joint coordination and monitoring plans among contracting 
parties 
abc-5 Chan et al., 2004; Yeung et al., 
2007 
Clearly defined equitable risk-sharing arrangement among 
contracting parties 
abc-6 Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2002; 
Ling et al., 2006b 
Flexible/adjustable contracts to address uncertainties abc-7 Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 2005 
Commitment level of contracting parties to joint problem 
solving 





















































Presence of conducive learning climate/environment abc-9 Chan et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2006 
Acceptance of dispute resolution mechanism for the project 
abc-10 Rahman and Kumaraswamy, 
2004a, 2004b 
Clarity of contract conditions (e.g. scope of contract, duties & 
responsibilities) 
abc-11 Wong and Cheung, 2005 
Real gain-share/pain-share among contracting parties abc-12 Black et al., 2000; Ling et al., 2006b 
Effectiveness of team-building events used in the project abc-13 Cheng and Li, 2001, 2002 



















































Table 2: Characteristics of Respondents 
Characteristic Beijing Hong Kong 





< 5 years 8 14 3 6 
5-9 years 14 24 4 8 
10-14 years 22 38 6 12 
≥ 15 years 14 24 37 74 
Average 11 22 
Min 2 3 
Max 30 56 
Organization 
type 
Government 10 18 15 29 
Engineering firm 1 2 3 6 
Architectural firm 10 18 0 0 
Quantity surveying 
firm 
5 9 3 6 
Contractor 32 57 27 53 




Public 30 52 23 45 
Private 13 22 27 53 
Joint Venture 15 26 1 2 
Average of public 
percentage 
45 50 
Size of total 
workforce 
< 100 12 21 2 4 
100-999 23 40 17 35 
≥ 1000 22 39 30 61 
Average 19934 3097 
Min 25 10 




































































Table 3: Extent of Differences between Beijing and Hong Kong 
Code 
Beijing Hong Kong ANOVA 
Mean T Sig. Mean T Sig. F Sig. 
Cost (Y1) 10.42% 2.866 0.006 12.50% 4.535 0.000 0.198 0.657 
Time (Y2) 8.41% 1.904 0.062 17.78% 5.213 0.000 2.721 0.102 
Quality 
(Y3) 3.19 3.296 0.002 3.98 11.364 0.000 62.222 0.000 
Client 
Satisfaction 
(Y4) 3.32 3.777 0.000 3.88 9.656 0.000 20.087 0.000 
a-6 3.56 3.795 0.000 4.28 9.456 0.000 12.839 0.001 
a-8 3.16 1.219 0.228 3.87 7.258 0.000 15.415 0.000 
a-9 3.07 0.482 0.632 3.77 5.468 0.000 11.303 0.001 
a-16 3.32 2.746 0.008 3.87 6.317 0.000 9.387 0.003 
b-9 3.45 4.259 0.000 3.90 7.019 0.000 7.587 0.007 
b-13 3.44 3.605 0.001 3.88 5.831 0.000 5.315 0.023 
c-9 3.26 2.668 0.010 3.63 4.555 0.000 4.838 0.030 
ab-8 3.69 5.680 0.000 3.24 1.900 0.063 6.232 0.014 
bc-1 3.04 0.256 0.799 3.56 4.288 0.000 7.113 0.009 
bc-6 3.13 1.044 0.301 3.53 3.400 0.001 4.334 0.040 
abc-1 3.29 2.664 0.010 3.92 8.267 0.000 15.995 0.000 
abc-4 3.66 7.519 0.000 3.14 1.188 0.241 12.777 0.001 









































































Cost (Y1) Time (Y2) Quality (Y3) 
Satisfaction 
(Y4) 
Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. 
bc-7 2.93     0.316 0.019   
a-1 2.96     0.267 0.047   
a-17 3.05     0.299 0.026   
bc-6 3.13       0.295 0.029 
c-17 3.16     0.275 0.041   
a-8 3.16 -0.290 0.035       
b-1 3.18     0.386 0.003 0.358 0.007 
ac-7 3.25       -0.271 0.043 
abc-10 3.27*   -0.280 0.040     
abc-1 3.29*       0.358 0.006 
a-16 3.32* -0.273 0.048       
bc-5 3.33*   0.371 0.007   0.299 0.026 
c-2 3.33*   -0.290 0.037     
bc-3 3.36*       0.305 0.022 
a-5 3.36*     0.290 0.030   
bc-8 3.41*       0.310 0.023 
a-14 3.43*   -0.382 0.005     
b-13 3.44*     0.267 0.048   
b-9 3.45*     0.325 0.015 0.280 0.037 
abc-11 3.47* -0.309 0.022       
ab-5 3.48*       0.348 0.009 
ac-5 3.50*     0.306 0.022   
b-5 3.61*   -0.287 0.039     
c-15 3.63* -0.277 0.045       
a-12 3.68* -0.341 0.015       
b-6 3.72*     0.274 0.045   
b-4 3.73*       0.294 0.028 
b-8 3.75*       0.270 0.044 
b-2 3.77*     0.416 0.001   
b-15 3.82*   -0.422 0.002 0.331 0.013   
c-12 3.82*   -0.386 0.005 0.307 0.020   
b-12 3.98*   -0.308 0.026     
Total 5 8 13 11 




































































Table 5: Correlation of RC Practices to Project Performance in Hong Kong 
RC 
Practices 
Mean Cost (Y1) Time (Y2) Quality (Y3) 
Satisfaction 
(Y4) 
Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. 
abc-6 2.82 -0.300 0.038 -0.349 0.015     
ab-7 3.00 -0.398 0.006 -0.318 0.031   0.386 0.006 
abc-13 3.06   -0.347 0.016   0.351 0.011 
ac-7 3.12 -0.435 0.005     0.372 0.014 
a-10 3.13   -0.374 0.012     
bc-7 3.14       0.316 0.039 
abc-4 3.14       0.375 0.007 
c-11 3.20     0.385 0.014 0.329 0.038 
ac-8 3.20     0.332 0.028 0.323 0.032 
a-5 3.21   -0.376 0.012     
c-10 3.25 -0.431 0.007     0.348 0.028 
c-5 3.30* -0.367 0.023 -0.415 0.010     
abc-10 3.31* -0.312 0.031       
a-4 3.32*       0.295 0.044 
bc-2 3.37*       0.305 0.047 
a-17 3.40*       0.311 0.033 
ab-2 3.43*       0.305 0.033 
ab-6 3.43*       0.295 0.039 
abc-2 3.44*     0.317 0.025   
b-11 3.45*     0.359 0.011 0.324 0.023 
ab-3 3.45*       0.342 0.016 
ab-5 3.47*   -0.317 0.032   0.352 0.013 
c-4 3.50* -0.323 0.048   0.331 0.037 0.349 0.027 
abc-3 3.50* -0.421 0.003 -0.409 0.004   0.311 0.028 
b-1 3.51*       0.417 0.003 
c-1 3.51*     0.345 0.027   
a-14 3.52*     0.367 0.012   
b-17 3.53*     0.300 0.036 0.292 0.042 
c-2 3.53*       0.325 0.040 
c-16 3.53* -0.443 0.005   0.456 0.003 0.507 0.001 
ab-1 3.53*   -0.328 0.026     
bc-6 3.53*     0.355 0.019 0.437 0.003 
b-10 3.55*       0.309 0.031 
c-13 3.60*       0.326 0.040 
ab-4 3.61*     0.291 0.042   
c-9 3.63* -0.322 0.048   0.315 0.048 0.392 0.012 
c-14 3.65* -0.499 0.001   0.418 0.007 0.403 0.010 
bc-4 3.65*       0.358 0.018 






































































Mean Cost (Y1) Time (Y2) Quality (Y3) 
Satisfaction 
(Y4) 
Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. 
a-15 3.68*       0.347 0.017 
c-15 3.70* -0.354 0.029   0.333 0.036 0.371 0.018 
ac-1 3.73*   -0.387 0.012     
abc-11 3.76*   -0.320 0.027     
a-9 3.77* -0.339 0.025       
b-16 3.80*       0.412 0.003 
a-8 3.87*   -0.320 0.034     
a-16 3.87* -0.362 0.016 -0.343 0.023 0.383 0.008 0.383 0.008 
b-9 3.90*       0.316 0.027 
abc-1 3.92*     0.332 0.017   
b-12 3.96*     0.360 0.011 0.406 0.004 
c-12 3.97* -0.414 0.010       
a-12 4.02*   -0.382 0.010     
b-8 4.02*       0.444 0.001 
b-14 4.02* -0.310 0.036   0.490 0.000 0.452 0.001 
b-15 4.02*     0.333 0.019 0.377 0.008 
b-2 4.06*       0.294 0.041 
Total 16 14 19 39 
Note: * significant at p<0.050 based on t test of the mean results 
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